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In one of the greatest and most controversial generalities of commercial law,
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code declares that many of the goods sold
today must be 'fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used 1
What is missing, however, is a detailed description or explanation as to what this
warranty of merchantability means. For example, the world is left to wonder
whether latent or unknown defects make a product unmerchantable if these
problems do not manifest themselves until long after the product is consumed.
Although the Uniform Commercial Code was first drafted over fifty years ago,
the precise meaning of merchantability is still unresolved
Perhaps the defining moment for the implied warranty of merchantability lies in
the future outcome of the tobacco cases. This note examines the past, present,
and future of tobacco litigation in an effort to distill the best possible
interpretation of the implied warranty of merchantability. After examining the
development of tort product liability theories and the conceptual framework of
the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchantability standard that relies on the
flunctional purpose of the goods emerges as the best result. Rather than focusing
on the subjective intention of the parties involved, the definition and application
of the implied warranty of merchantability should rely on an objective standard
based on the product's most basic function.
After establishing this standard, this note concludes by describing the current
debate over the liability of fast-food merchants for the obesity problems in this
country. The fast-food litigation will invariably follow the path of the tobacco
cases. Therefore, the merchantability jurisprudence arising from tobacco
lawsuits will be crucial in predicting the future of the implied warranty in the
fast-food cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of tobacco litigation, plaintiffs have used a variety of
legal theories when bringing actions against the tobacco industry. Strict products
liability, failure to warn, simple negligence, conspiracy, RICO, unjust enrichment,
and Medicaid subrogation are all theories that confront litigants and courts today.2
One legal claim that has survived from the beginning is the implied warranty of
merchantability, 3 sometimes referred to in its earlier forms as the implied
warranty of wholesomeness or quality. Because so much of what defines the
implied warranty surrounds the determination of whether particular goods are
merchantable within the meaning of section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."), the study of tobacco litigation provides a different perspective
from which to analyze the intricacies of merchantability. Cigarettes are a truly
unique product with a storied past. Although our justice system has provided
examples in other mass tort cases involving prescription drugs and industrial
substances like asbestos, cigarettes do not neatly fit into any of these categories.
Thus, courts have found themselves in a position of choosing merely to look at
cigarettes in the context of their basic use for smoking, or by expanding their
analysis further by examining whether cigarettes possess hidden dangers that
render them unmerchantable.
This note seeks to accomplish two goals-one descriptive, the other
prescriptive. Part I examines the basic applications of the implied warranty of
merchantability and then collects the cases dealing with tobacco litigation in an
analysis of how the courts have applied the implied warranty to cigarettes. Part H
provides the reader with an outline of the implied warranty and its general
functions and details. This outline provides the reader with a foundation for later
understanding the history and evolution of the implied warranty, including its
contemporary application to tobacco litigation. Part IU describes the history of the
tobacco cases and how the law has developed, paying specific attention to the
implied warranty of merchantability. Part IV analyzes the main U.C.C. section
2-314 issues that face today's tobacco litigants by offering an analysis of
contemporary case law. This Part is especially comprehensive in the sense that it
explores areas that affect the basic implied warranty, yet seem far removed from
the basic warranty language.
2 The University of California at San Francisco has placed a collection of tobacco industry
documents on the Internet. These include various pleadings and briefs from various states'
Attorneys General that describe the legal theories used today. University of California at San
Francisco, Tobacco Control Archives, at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
litigation/states.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2001); see Task Force on Tobacco Litigation, 27
CuMB. L. REV. 575 (1996) (providing a feasibility study for the Alabama Attorney General
concerning the possible success of pursuing a subrogation claim against the tobacco industry).
3 U.C.C. § 2-314.
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The prescriptive analysis explains how courts should change their current
application of U.C.C. section 2-314 by adopting a basic interpretation such that
cigarettes should be deemed merchantable, so long as they fulfill their functional
purpose without regard to their latent impact on health. Part VI analyzes the
underlying policy of the implied warranty and provides a new analysis of
merchantability that focuses on the ostensible, functional purpose of goods as
opposed to any analysis of hidden dangers in determining whether goods are
merchantable. The tobacco cases of the last fifty years have provided a stage for
courts to develop fully the law of merchantability, and too often the result has
been an extensive evaluation of hidden dangers and subjective intentions that
receive a more appropriate analysis under products liability and consumer law.
This process has resulted in the implied warranty of merchantability becoming
nearly synonymous with a strict products liability claim under section 402A of the
second Restatement of Torts ("Restatement section 402A"), which is a far cry
from the buyer's basic promise that the goods will fulfill their basic function.
After proposing a "functional purpose" test for determining product
merchantability, this note explains the need for such a basic interpretation of
U.C.C. section 2-314. Specifically, the reader will find that the expansive analysis
engendered by many courts in applying section 2-314 usually results in the
nullification of the implied warranty of merchantability, as it is subsumed within
the courts' basic products liability jurisprudence, usually under Restatement
section 402A. Additionally, a broad inquiry into whether products are
merchantable is not consistent with the conceptual framework envisioned by the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The analysis closes with a look at the new frontier for the implied warranty of
merchantability-fast food litigation.4 Those who oppose the prevalence of fast
food, also known as "toxic food," in our society have mimicked the anti-tobacco
campaigns in an effort to regulate the fast food industry. In fact, one of the key
players in the anti-tobacco movement, Professor John Banzhaf, is now leading the
charge against fast food.5
Those intrigued by the recent events in the field of mass tort litigation that
concern the fast food industry should pay special attention to the history and
analysis of tobacco litigation contained in the coming pages. The history of
tobacco litigation is the future of the fast food industry. Those who dismiss the
likelihood of success for fast food plaintiffs have not grasped the lesson of
tobacco litigation. As Professor Banzhaf recently stated, "[w]e know from
4 See Jonathan Turley, Fast Food Litigation Suddenly on Litigation Fast Track,
CoLuMBus DISPATCH, July 31, 2002, at A7 ("Leave it to lawyers to combine the two favorite
American pastimes: eating and suing. In various states, lawsuits have been filed or are being
planned against the fast-food industry.").
5 Professor Banzhaf maintains a website describing his position and recent events in the
battle against fast food. See John F Banzhaf m, Using Legal Action to Help Fight Obesity, at
http://www.banzhaf.net/obesitylinks (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
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tobacco litigation that initial suits have real difficulties because the public has real
problems accepting new ideas and new concepts.... It took us many years to get
us to the point of educating juries about tobacco, [but] now they are. ' 6
By establishing a proper jurisprudence with the tobacco cases, courts can set
the correct precedent for adjudicating fast food litigation. As many courts apply
the implied warranty of merchantability to the tobacco cases, they open the door
to successful claims that fast food is unmerchantable merely because it is high in
fat, calories, and sodium. Reshaping their jurisprudence as described herein will
avoid the further distortion and misapplication of the implied warranty of
merchantability when it is applied to fast food litigation.
II. A PRIMER ON THE U.C.C. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
The implied warranty of merchantability, codified in section 2-314 of the
U.C.C., is no less than the seller's implied promise that the goods sold in a
contract of sale will work. It is a warranty that arises as an operation of law, as
opposed to an affirmative promise from the seller, and simply codifies the parties'
expectations of what the goods are for and what they will accomplish for the
buyer. In this way, the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability gives teeth
to the bargain and provides the buyer with one method for forcing the seller to
behave properly. Where the seller is a merchant and nothing else is said between
the parties concerning the expected performance of the goods, the buyer at least
benefits from the basic promise that the goods will fulfill the basic function of
their ordinary purpose. There are, however, many nuances to U.C.C.
section 2-314, which are discussed below.
A. The Language
As with any discussion of American statutory law, we first begin with the
language. Section 2-314 of the U.C.C. provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
6 Geraldine Sealey, Whopper of a Lawsuit: Fast Food Chains Blamed for Obesity,
Illnesses, ABCNEwS.COM (July 26, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.comsections/us/
DailyNews/fatsuit020725.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) (reporting on a class action lawsuit
filed by Caesar Barber against four major fast food producers for health related illness resulting
from Barber's consumption of fast food).
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(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.7
Some aspects of the warranty are express and rather clear, such as the
mention of disclaimers and the requirement that the seller be a merchant as to
goods. Other language is considerably more nebulous. For example, subsection 2
of U.C.C. section 2-314, describing the minimum qualifications of
merchantability, is full of language that crafty attorneys could manipulate to their
advantage. One does not need extensive research to see clearly that whether
goods "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ' 8 can
create a variety of angles and arguments, thus creating much litigation. The
following sections examine the nuances of the implied warranty in detail.
1. Some Initial Conditions to the Warranty: Merchants and Disclaimers
The first sentence of U.C.C. section 2-314 provides some important
conditions that must be examined before moving on to the actual warranty
language. A quick reading of the text points to some important requirements of
section 2-314 in this opening sentence. As noted above, this is an implied
warranty. It does not arise out of any promises made by sellers; rather, it arises as
an operation of law, meaning that sellers make the warranty unless they disclaim
it.9 Moreover, it is a warranty made only by merchants with respect to goods of
the kind involved in the contract of sale. Tobacco companies are always the main
defendants in the tobacco cases, and there is never any problem as to whether
cigarette manufacturers can be fairly deemed "merchant[s] with respect to goods
of that kind." 10 The former aspect of the implied warranty, the one allowing a
merchant to disclaim section 2-314 of the U.C.C., deserves brief analysis.
7 U.C.C. § 2-314.
8 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
9 lId § 2-314(1).
10 Id Section 2-104 of the U.C.C. defines the term "merchant" as it is used in the Code.
Although Official Comment 2 of section 2-104 specifically mentions section 2-314 and states
that a merchant with respect to goods of that kind is narrower than the general definition of
"merchant," it is undisputed as to whether tobacco manufacturers possess the "professional
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The Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-316 allows for a variety of ways
to disclaim the implied warranties it creates.11 In the context of tobacco litigation,
it suffices to say that the disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
never arises in the tobacco cases, which is likely due to the restrictions imposed
on sellers dealing in consumer goods. As a general matter, many states have
either modified their respective U.C.C. Article 2, or they have included provisions
in separate consumer protection statutes that declare any attempt to disclaim the
implied warranty of merchantability unenforceable. 12 Disclaiming the warranty
status as to [the] particular kind of goods" suggested by Official Comment 2 as a suitable
description for a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
It is also important to note that only "sellers" give implied warranties. A "seller" is "a
person who sells or contracts to sell goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d). Thus, cigarette
manufacturers may clearly be merchants, but may not necessarily be sellers if they are not a
party to the contract for sale to the individual smokers. In other words, a cigarette manufacturer
may argue that it is not a seller because it is never a party to the contract of sale of cigarettes to
the smoker. Rather, the warranty is made by a local retailer who is the proper "seller." This
argument stems from a basic contractual concept that parties owe no duty unless they are in
privity of contract with the aggrieved party. The U.C.C. provides no definite position on the
concept of privity between the manufacturer and end-purchasers (known as "vertical privity").
See U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3. Although this distinction rarely plays a part when determining
whether cigarette manufacturers make an implied warranty of merchantability to individual
smokers, it does play a role in some interpretations of the notice requirement for a breach of
warranty claim under U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a). See infra note 213.
Privity of contract also plays an important role with respect to defendants who are not
cigarette manufacturers. Early in the tobacco and health debate, the tobacco industry created
certain research committees with the intent of distributing scientific information to challenge the
growing concern about smoking. See Player, infra note 40, at 323. Plaintiffs have brought
actions against organizations like The Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research
in an attempt to hold them liable under the same theories used against actual cigarette
manufacturers. Since warranty law only applies to sellers and buyers, courts quickly find that
warranty claims against these organizations are not valid, for there is no contract of sale
between the research institutions and the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Algood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 80 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Even where a party has promoted a product, and made
promises regarding that product, if the party is not the actual seller a claim for breach of
warranty will not lie.") (citations omitted).
11 U.C.C. § 2-316.
12 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(5) (2001) ("Nothing in subsection (2) or subsection
(3)(a) or in Section 7-2-317 shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the seller's liability for
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods."). The practitioner should note,
however, that the language of the Alabama statute does not prevent the disclaimer of
merchantability from arising out of the usage of trade or in situations where the buyer has
examined, or properly refused to examine, the goods. § 7-2-316(3)(b); see also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-639(a) (2000) ("[N]o supplier shall: (1) exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to
limit the implied warranties of merchantability .... "); MD. COM. LAw I § 2-316.1(2) (Supp.
2002) ("Any oral or written language used by a seller of consumer goods and services, which
attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those
1172
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of merchantability is one valid method sellers employ to limit their liability.
Consumer advocates, however, would interpret a warranty disclaimer as the seller
essentially saying, "Don't trust us-our goods don't work, but we'd be happy to
take your money." In many states, the consumers won this battle, and any attempt
to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability is void. This explains the
absence of disclaimers from the reported tobacco cases.
2. The Meaning of Merchantability
Although the U.C.C. does not define merchantability per se, subsection 2 of
2-314 provides a list of minimum qualities that goods must possess in order to be
merchantable. 13 The characteristics given for merchantable goods may be
summarized in three broad statements: (1) the goods must be of average quality
when compared with other similar goods in the industry, (2) they must be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which goods are used," and (3) they must be properly
packaged and labeled. 14 Courts have applied the warranty of merchantability 15 in
a variety of situations, including the wholesomeness of food 16 and the adverse
side-effects of pharmaceuticals. 17 The meaning of merchantability will generally
warranties, is unenforceable."); MASS ANN. LAws ch. 106 § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002)
(prohibiting merchants from disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of
consumer goods); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A § 2-316(5) (2001) ("Any language, oral or written,
used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or
modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to
exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be
unenforceable."); RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-316:104, at 187-89 (3d ed. 1995) (providing a partial list of various state consumer
statutes).
13 See U.C.C. section 2-314, comment 6, which states:
Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "merchantable" nor to negate
any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the statute, but arising by
usage of trade or through case law. The language used is "must be at least such as ... "
and the intention is to leave open other possible attributes of merchantability.
14 See U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
15 See generally C. Clifford Allen, Annotation, What Are "Merchantable" Goods Within
Meaning of U. C.C. § 2-314 Dealing With Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 83 A.L.R. 3d
694 (Supp. 2001). This annotation provides a starting point for collecting the cases defining
merchantability. Another source is the U.C.C. Reporting Service, which includes a digest
organized by U.C.C. section number.
16 See Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1964) (holding
that fish chowder containing fish bones was merchantable because the plaintiff, a New England
native, should have guarded against the presence of bones in the chowder).
17 See Fllows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 299-300 (D. Md. 1980)
(holding that a prescription drug was merchantable even though it produced an unwanted side-
effect in the plaintift).
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be an issue of fact18 based on the type of goods at hand.19 President Andrew
Jackson once said, "It is a damn poor mind that can only think of one way to spell
a word."20 The same logic essentially applies to anyone trying to define the term
"merchantability," especially the phrase "fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used."
Each of the three broad concepts of merchantability, especially the fitness for
ordinary purpose and proper packaging and labeling, plays an important role in
current tobacco litigation. In fact, these issues are interlaced with federal
preemption questions,21 the alleged manipulation of nicotine levels, 22 and the
controversial question of whether cigarettes are unmerchantable because smoking
often results in chronic illness.23 Deciding whether cigarettes are merchantable is
probably more crucial in litigating this issue today than it has been in the past.
Courts are continually faced with the questions of how far they should evaluate
the hidden dangers of smoking and whether there are any truly hidden dangers of
smoking at all. Because the question of merchantability is quite factual in nature,
it does not lend itself to broad statements of the law. Therefore, specific treatment
by the courts of the tobacco and merchantability question deserves, and receives,
its own individual analysis as it relates to current cases in Part IV.B.
18 See 2 THE AMERICAN LAW OFWARRANTIES § 13:63, at 314-15 (1991), which states:
The question of whether goods are merchantable under the Uniform Commercial Code is
generally one of fact for the jury.... In some circumstances the court should rule that as a
matter of law there has been no breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. When
there is conflicting evidence as to whether the seller breached an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, the question is one of fact for the jury.
19 As White and Summers appropriately claim, "[w]e cannot hope to summarize the
thousands of cases that deal with the question of merchantability. We can only suggest where a
frustrated lawyer might look for help in determining whether the goods of his particular case
ought to be classified as merchantable or nonmerchantable." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-8, at 366 (5th ed. 2000).
20 This quote was retrieved from Rand Lindsly's Quotes, at
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?homesearch=Andrew+Jackson&x=58&y=12
(last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
21 See infra Part lV.A.2.
22 See infra Part IV.B.
23 Some early comments on the Code have even contemplated that U.C.C. section 2-314
could extend to an analysis of hidden dangers and whether or not that problem could make
cigarettes unmerchantable. See CHARLES BuNN Er AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.26(B), at 99-101 (1964).
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B. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability: Elements of the
Claim
To succeed in a suit for the breach of implied warranty, the plaintiff must
show the following: (1) that a merchant sold goods,24 (2) that the goods were not
merchantable, (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury and resulting damages, (4) that
the unmerchantable goods were both a proximate cause and a cause in fact for the
plaintiff's injuries, and (5) that the plaintiff gave proper notice to the seller of the
breach of warranty.25 Of these above elements, this note cannot attempt to cope
with the seemingly immense burden of proving both a plaintiff's injury from
smoking and that smoking was the proximate cause of the injury. Such tasks are
left for the individual plaintiffs, their attorneys, and their experts. The issues of
whether the seller is a merchant and whether the goods are merchantable are
described above.26 The issue of proper notice, however, deserves brief treatment
here.
With respect to accepted goods, "the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy .... -27 The Official Comment for U.C.C. section
2-607 states that reasonableness in the notice context will be governed by
commercial standards. 28 Additionally, the contents of the notice need not be
24 Privity between the manufacturer and the smoker only arises occasionally as an issue
when private plaintiffs litigate tobacco cases. See Watkins v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
98-130, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23328, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 14, 1998) (finding the plaintiff
failed to establish privity of contract with the tobacco defendant). However, privity of contract
may be an issue when states sue tobacco companies based on their Medicaid subrogation
statutes for recovery of state Medicaid expenditures for smokers suffering from illnesses caused
by cigarettes. For a thorough analysis of the issues faced by states when deciding to file a
Medicaid subrogation suit, the reader should refer to Alabama's analysis of the situation in Task
Force on Tobacco Litigation, supra note 2.
Privity of contract also plays a role when employee retirement organizations and unions
seek to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of members. These claims often fail to
overcome the fact that the retirement plan or union itself was not in privity of contract with the
cigarette manufacturer and thus could not recover. See Ark. Carpenters' Health & Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936, 945 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (dismissing a claim for
breach of implied warranty and noting that the plaintiff never alleged that it purchased any
tobacco products); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664-65 (N.D. M. 1998) ("mhe Funds neither allege that they
purchased the tobacco products nor ever relied on any of the alleged representations regarding
the defendants' products. Accordingly, count VII [breach of warranty] is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim, and altematively, for the Funds' lack of standing.").
25 See WHITE & SuMMERs, supra note 19, § 9-7, at 510-11.
26 See supra Part II.A.1.
27 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2000).
28 See comment 4 of U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a), which states:
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formal and need not include a threat of litigation, although at least one court has
held that the pleadings alone are sufficient notice of breach of warranty. 29 Notice
can occur either in oral or written form. 30
It is important to note briefly the harshness of section 2-607(3)(a). The
statutory language states that in the absence of proper notice, the buyer will be
precluded from all U.C.C. remedies, which include such provisions as revocation
of acceptance and the right to sue for damages.31 Although notice is a relatively
simple matter, compliance is a necessity, and any lawyer must be careful not to
overlook the requirement. 32
C. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability: The Defenses
The U.C.C. affirmative defenses to a breach of warranty claim that are most
relevant to this note are statute of limitations and assumption of risk.33 The
U.C.C. provision governing the statute of limitations is section 2-725, which
provides that the suit must be commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrues. 34 As to the question of when the cause of action accrues, sellers
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a
merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is to be
judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring
notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith
consumer of his remedy.
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the
transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. There is no reason to require that the
notification which saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear
statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section
covering statements of defects upon rejection (Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for
requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other
resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need
only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and
thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.
29 Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789, 792 (Ariz. 1977); see also infra note 214
and accompanying text.
30 WHrTE& SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 11-10, at 421.
31 Id. at 417.
32 See infra Part IV.C.2.
33 Although the U.C.C. affirmative defenses may seem limited, defendants are often
successful in arguing that cigarettes are in fact merchantable. Defendants are also utilizing other
defenses such as federal and state preemption.
34 U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2001) (permitting parties to reduce the statute of limitations to not
less than one year but forbidding the parties to extend it beyond the four-year limitation). The
U.C.C.'s four-year statute of limitations provides an important contrast to the popular tort
claims of strict products liability. Products liability cases, such as those brought under section
402A of the second Restatement of Torts on strict products liability, comply with state statute of
limitation laws that are generally two years in duration. See, e.g., OHmo REv. CODE ANN.
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breach the implied warranty of merchantability upon tender of delivery,
regardless of whether the buyer knows of the breach. 35 Thus, the purchase of
goods is the moment when the action accrues for a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability. 36 This is seemingly a harsh result, but U.C.C. section 2-725(4)
stipulates that other state law relating to the tolling of the statute of limitations
remains in effect and is not disturbed by the U.C.C.'s statute of limitations.
Practitioners must pay close attention to state law when analyzing the statute of
limitations problem surrounding their case.37
The assumption of risk defense and its variations, especially as they relate to
strict products liability, play a major role in tobacco litigation, and will likely
serve as a component of every case seeking to impose liability on the tobacco
industry. From the standpoint of a typical breach of implied warranty case,
jurisdictions have differing views on how plaintiffs' negligent conduct affects
their ability to recover. Most will agree that when plaintiffs assume the risks
associated with using particular goods, they are completely barred from recovery,
but what constitutes assumption of risk will vary from state to state.38 Since this
portion of the note is only a primer, it suffices to say that assumption of risk issues
require careful thought and research in order to determine how they apply in each
jurisdiction. Specific assumption of risk issues as they relate to tobacco litigation
are addressed in Part W.C. 1.
1H. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION
Tobacco litigation in America has been transformed significantly in the
nearly fifty years since Eva Cooper filed suit against RJ. Reynolds in
Massachusetts, a case that produced the first reported decision concerning
tobacco and its effect on health.39 Initially, the debate turned on legal theories
addressing warranties, foreseeability, and assumption of risk issues. In the
§ 2305.10 (Anderson 2001); see also WHrIE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 11-9, at 413. Thus,
a claim for injury based on the implied warranty of merchantability may give a plaintiff more
time to recover than the shorter two-year statute applied in most products liability cases.
35 U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (2001).
36 See 1 THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., UNinRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8.20, at 8:118
(2001) ("With regard to implied warranties .... the breach occurs (if at all) at the time of tender
(for the obvious reason that, by its very nature, an implied waranty cannot explicitly extend to
future performance)."). Crandall also notes that some states have altered the application of the
statute of limitations concerning products liability actions and warranty actions involving
personal injury. Id at 8:120.
37 The tobacco cases have also produced some opinions addressing the U.C.C.'s statute of
limitations; those cases are collected and analyzed in Part V.A.1.
38 WHiTE & SUMMERs, supra note 19, § 11-8, at 408-09. Many states have also legislated
on the issue of comparative fault and assumption of risk. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(Anderson 2001); see also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 11-8, at 411.
39 Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
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contemporary era, tobacco plaintiffs are armed with significantly more
information and new angles of attack. The following sections analyze the three
eras of tobacco litigation, including the current context and how it evolved.40
A. The Early Years
1. The First Cases
The question of foreseeability of harm from smoking dominated the early
days of tobacco litigation. Cigarette manufacturers often claimed that any harm
caused by smoking was simply not foreseeable due to the lack of scientific
research available at the time.41 This defense is somewhat peculiar in light of the
history of implied warranties. Professor Samuel Williston found in 1948 that most
American jurisdictions had adopted the English concept of implied warranties of
quality and that the obligation of the manufacturer is strict, not merely one of
negligence.4 2 Whatever the state of law, courts of the era generally allowed
tobacco companies to avoid liability based on the fact that they could not foresee
the potential harm from smoking. Although some of the early cases occurred
before the adoption of the U.C.C., a brief review is instructive in understanding
the development of the theory.
Green v. American Tobacco Companies43 represents the first major implied
warranty case involving a plaintiff seeking recovery from the tobacco industry for
injuries resulting from smoking cigarettes. Edwin Green, Sr. initially filed suit in
1957 claiming that he contracted lung cancer from smoking Lucky Strike
40 This note will not provide new revelations in the history of tobacco litigation. Others
have written excellent histories, and the reader is encouraged to examine these sources for a
more thorough study. See generally Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands, or Butts:
Big Tobacco is Fighting for Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting
Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L. REv. 99 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the
Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992); Marcia L. Stein, Cigarette Products
Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REv. 631 (1987); Tucker S. Player, Note, After the
Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49
S.C. L. REv. 311 (1998).
41 Dietsch Field, supra note 40, at 106. The public scare relating to smoking and health
began in the 1950's with a number of articles from popular publications like The Readers'
Digest. See Rabin, supra note 40, at 856-57. Even with the escalating level of public
information and concern, the concept of foreseeability was considerably narrower fifty years
ago than it is today. Id. at 861. Thus, tobacco defendants could argue no decisive scientific data
existed to reasonably indicate that cigarettes were harmful.
42 1 SAMUEL WILUSTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 237, at 617-20 (rev. ed. 1948).
Williston also points to the enactment of the pre-U.C.C. Uniform Sales Act and its section 15
which created implied warranties, including an implied warranty of merchantability. Id.
43 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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cigarettes. 44 Green died shortly thereafter and his son was substituted as plaintiff
alleging, among other claims, breach of implied warranty.45 The case went to the
jury which returned a verdict for the defendants, finding that American Tobacco
could not have foreseen the adverse health effects of smoking and thus could not
be liable under an implied warranty of merchantability.46 Green appealed the trial
court's judgment, claiming that the ability to foresee the harm of smoking tobacco
is irrelevant to the determination of breach of implied warranty.47 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's interpretation of the
applicable implied warranty law as imposing liability only when the defendant is
capable of foreseeing the alleged harm.48 However, the Fifth Circuit decided to
certify49 the question of foreseeability to the Florida Supreme Court, recognizing
the potential impact of this claim and the importance of the case at hand.50
The Florida Supreme Court eventually determined that foreseeability, in fact,
was not a required element for establishing a breach of implied warranty.51 This
ruling struck a major blow to tobacco defendants by stripping them of the ability
to avoid warranty claims by stating the harm from smoking was not foreseeable. 52
The reality of the situation, however, was much different. First, in the final
44 Id. at 71.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 71-72.
47 Id. at 73.
48 id
4 9 Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70,77 (5th Cir. 1962).
5 0 Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). While Green was pending
certification in Florida, the analysis of foreseeability and implied warranties continued in
another case in the Fifth Circuit. Between the time of certification and the Florida Supreme
Court's answer in Green, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same foreseeability
issue in Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), another major case
concerning implied warranties. See Dietsch Field, supra note 40, at 101-03. Lartigue, a lifelong
smoker for fifty-five years, contracted lung cancer and died in 1955. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 22.
His widow filed suit after his death and alleged breach of warranty and negligence. l After
losing at trial, Lartigue's widow appealed on the basis that the trial court's jury instructions had
mischaracterized the then implied warranty of wholesomeness as one hinging on whether the
tobacco manufacturer could foresee the ill-effects of smoking. Id. at 23. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals analyzed Louisiana law pertaining to implied warranties as well as the recent release
of Restatement section 402A from the American Law Institute. l at 25-31. The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the law of strict liability was still developing and the lines between
warranty and tort were somewhat blurred. Id at 39. In any event, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's characterization of wholesomeness as requiring a showing that the defendant could
foresee the harm caused by cigarette smoking before liability would be triggered. Id. at 39-41.
51 Green, 154 So. 2d at 170 ("Upon the critical point, our decisions conclusively establish
the principle that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of
a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of
implied warranty .... ).
52 See Stein, supra note 40, at 636.
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analysis of Green and after twelve years of litigation, the Fifth Circuit ultimately
concluded that cigarettes were in fact merchantable.53 Second, as hinted by the
conclusion in Green, the sheer burden of litigation often battered plaintiffs into
submission. A common tactic that survives today is the strategy of litigating every
case to the end in an attempt to exhaust the plaintiff's resources. 54 Some cases
that were seen as shining lights with some modest hope of success for plaintiffs
were actually abandoned for lack of resources, as opposed to exhaustion of legal
theory.55
2. The Legislative and Policy Front
The close of the first wave of tobacco litigation saw the advent of three key
events in the saga of tobacco litigation: the publishing of the Report to the
Surgeon General on Smoking ("1964 Report"), 56 the adoption of the American
Law Institute's ("ALl") Restatement section 402A concerning strict products
liability,57 and the enactment of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
53 In an interesting conclusion, the Fifth Circuit eventually overruled one of its prior
decisions by concluding that cigarettes were merchantable, and thus any discussion of
affirmative defenses, like contributory negligence, would be irrelevant. See Green v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (adopting Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97,
110 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J., dissenting) (finding that cigarettes are not defective and do not
breach any warranties of merchantability)).
54 See Rabin, supra note 40, at 857-58.
55 ld at 863 (describing Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 1961), where the plaintiff was forced to abandon the suit for lack of resources).
56 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY CoMMrnTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PuB. HEALTH SERVICE (1964)
[hereinafter 1964 REPORT].
5 7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965). This section states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
lad In 1998, the ALl published the third Restatement of Torts dealing exclusively with products
liability issues. Few courts have explored the doctrines proposed in the third Restatement of
Torts; their reluctance to do so probably results from the many state legislatures that have
elected to codify products liability law instead of relying on state courts to develop the common
law doctrines. Of the states that have codified their products liability law, most of them have
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("1965 Act"). 58 Each had an important impact on the tobacco liability dynamic
and also marked the end of major tobacco litigation for the next twenty years.
Before the release of the 1964 Report, the causal connection between
smoking and deteriorating health lacked an air of conclusiveness. The American
public fed on a steady diet of journalistic attacks by The Reader's Digest, Time,
Newsweek, The Atlantic Monthly, Harper's, The New Republic, and The
Nation,59 but the country lacked a definitive statement establishing the adverse
impact of smoking on health. The Surgeon General's report was highly publicized
and established a scientific causal link between smoking and a variety of cancers
and related illnesses.60 Coupled with the earlier attacks on tobacco from the news
media, the Surgeon General's report seemingly put America on notice that
cigarette smoking was inherently dangerous.61 Since assumption of risk was a
defense to the implied warranty cases, 62 the impact of affirmatively establishing
the public's knowledge of the dangers of cigarette smoking could be devastating
for plaintiffs, especially in light of the fact that a plaintiff's knowledge of the ill-
effects of smoking has "hovered like a storm cloud over every smoker's claim
against the tobacco companies. '63
Next, the adoption of Restatement section 402A revolutionized the thinking
on strict products liability. Significantly, some of the debate concerning the
precise language of section 402A revolved around its perceived impact on the
tobacco industry.64 Dean Prosser drafted Restatement section 402A to read that
liability will follow for products that are in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" to the user.65 Others objected by stating that the addition of the word
"defective" was redundant because "unreasonably dangerous" would provide the
same result.66 Some advisors even expressed specific concern about the tobacco
industry and the need to protect its economic viability.67 Prosser evidently
concurred with the position and indicated that items such as whiskey and
based their statutes on Restatement section 402A. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying
text.
58 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92,79 Stat. 282 (1965).
59 See Stein, supra note 40, at 643; Rabin, supra note 40, at 856-57 (citing several
magazine articles).
60 See id. at 643 (citing 1964 REPORT, supra note 56, at 37-39).
61 See id at 642-43.
6 2 See Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479,485 (3d Cir. 1965).
63 Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 475, 493
(1991) (review essay).
64 Stein, supra note 40, at 642.
65 Rabin, supra note 40, at 863 (citing 38th Annual Meeting, 1962 A.L.I. PRoc. 87-89
(1961)).
66 ld.
67 Stein, supra note 40, at 642.
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cigarettes may be considered dangerous, but nonetheless were not defective.68
This seems to have ended the matter as Prosser incorporated his position into
Comment i, and the ALl members approved Restatement section 402A on a
voice vote.69
Finally, the tobacco industry asserted its political strength 7° when Congress
passed the 1965 Act.71 This Act required that each package of cigarettes display
the warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health."72
Furthermore, the Act prohibited states from imposing any further requirements on
tobacco manufacturers about labeling their products.73 This requirement created a
68 Rabin, supra note 40, at 863. The verbal debate was not the only indication of how
Restatement section 402A should apply to the tobacco industry-the official comment
explained a great deal about the drafter's intent with regard to cigarettes. Comment i to
Restatement section 402A states that "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. i (1965). Considering the major influence the Restatements have on American courts, and
the clear intent that strict products liability under Restatement section 402A should not apply to
cigarettes, the end of the first round of tobacco litigation seemed a certainty. See Rabin, supra
note 40, at 864 ("In a sense, the Restatement proviso sounded the death knell for the first wave
of tobacco litigation.").
69 Stein, supra note 40, at 642 (citing 38th Annual Meeting, 1962 A.L.I. PROc. 87-89
(1961)).
70 See id at 645-46 (providing a concise description of the political power wielded by the
tobacco industry and its supporters in Congress).
71 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965). Section 10 of the 1965 Act established an expiration date for the Act of July 1, 1969.
Congress then passed the new and similar, Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub.
L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40). The most
important change in the 1969 Act was the preemptive language in 15 U.S.C. § 1334, making
the reach of the 1969 Act seemingly broader than the 1965 Act. This 1969 Act language
remains unchanged today. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 514-15 (1992);
see also infra note 73.
72 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 4.
73 Id § 5(a)-(b). These subsections state:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by
section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
Act.
Id. Foreshadowing Supreme Court analysis, the reader may contrast the 1965 Act language
with the language from the section 5(a)-(b) of the 1969 Act:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by
section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
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much-litigated issue concerning preemption that found only a troubled resolution
when it reached the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.74 during the 1990s.
At the close of the first round of tobacco litigation, the industry's position
seemed unassailable.75 The plaintiffs achieved no victories in the first round of
litigation,76 while the tobacco companies consistently pummeled plaintiffs with
litigation strategies designed to exhaust their comparatively meager resources.
Moreover, those who did survive faced the issue of foreseeability of harm in an
environment where few were willing to impute the knowledge of the ill-effects of
smoking to the tobacco industry. Defendants were also armed with the Green
decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that cigarettes were, in
fact, merchantable. 77 By virtue of its successes in legislation and Restatement
section 402A, the tobacco industry closed out the initial era of tobacco litigation
unscathed.
B. Round Two: Strict Products Liability Revisited
The advent of asbestos litigation and a general public concern for mass tort
issues78 prompted lawyers to revisit varying theories of products liability in the
early 1980s.79 Most notably, lawyers keyed on a change in the concept of strict
liability that focused on the inherent dangers of a product instead of the
foreseeability problems that plagued the warranty cases of the early years.80 New
concepts of strict liability from influential commentators like Professors John
Wade8' and Donald W. Garner82 encouraged plaintiffs to assert that cigarettes
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act § 5(a)-(b) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made
much of this change in language. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
74 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Cipollone presents numerous complex issues of federal
preemption that affect tobacco litigation today, including warranty issues arising out of state
law. This note will deal with these concepts as they relate to contemporary tobacco litigation in
Part IV.A.2.
75 See Stein, supra note 40, at 646.
76 Rabin, supra note 40, at 864.
77 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78 See Toxic TORTS AND PRODUCT LLABmTY: CHANGING TAcncs FOR CHANGING TIMES
(Michael A. Brown ed., 1989). Brown provides a thorough evaluation of products liability
theories involved with the rise of mass tort litigation through the 1980s. Specifically, Brown's
work examines asbestos litigation, environmental hazards, radiation injuries, and tobacco
litigation. Id.
79 Rabin, supra note 40, at 864.
80 Id. at 866.
81 Stein, supra note 40, at 646 (citing the following as Professor Wade's significant
articles: John Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
551 (1980); John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973); John Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965)). For a
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were defective and unreasonably dangerous and thus tobacco companies should
be strictly liable for the resulting harm.83
Regardless of the theory, the results were much the same. Large tobacco
companies maintained their strategy from the early cases and sought to exhaust
the resources of the plaintiffs. 84 Spurred on by the liability and demise of the
asbestos industry, tobacco companies caught a glimpse of the future and
responded with a heightened resolution to survive the litigation process. 85
Although the majority of the second round remained focused on the
developing law of mass tort and products liability, plaintiffs continued using
breach of warranty claims in their lawsuits.86 However, the result was much the
same as the first wave of litigation. By this time, section 2-314 of the U.C.C.
provided the primary means of asserting a claim for a breach of implied warranty,
and among the established defenses to a breach of implied warranty was
assumption of risk. A complete understanding of this defense and how it affected
litigation may be seen by examining the national perception of smokers and their
plight. The established mood at the time was one of great concern for personal
health and safety.87 Moreover, constant scientific research following the Surgeon
General's landmark report in 1964 created a public sense that smoking was
clearly damaging to personal health.88 As Professor Robert L. Rabin states,
"[s]moking, which had seemed such a natural accoutrement of the good life, was
now regarded with disdain by many-as an unhealthy sign of a weak
character." 89 It is no wonder, then, why the implied warranty of merchantability
supplied no victories to tobacco plaintiffs in this middle round of litigation. Even
if a breach of implied warranty claim survived the pretrial litigation marathon,
plaintiffs were likely to face a jury that was knowledgeable about the health
effects of smoking and probably unsympathetic to the plight of a smoker who
likely assumed the risks of his habit. Even worse, a debate was brewing over
failure to warn issues, insufficient labeling claims, and the preemptive effect of
contemporary view of product liability under the third Restatement of Torts, see Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 487 (1998).
82 See Stein, supra note 40, at 653 (citing Donald W. Gamer, Cigarette Dependency and
Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423 (1980)).
83 Plaintiffs were also encouraged by a move to a risk-utility analysis of products liability
in which plaintiffs could assert the scientific evidence showing the tremendous harm caused by
tobacco. See Rabin, supra note 40, at 866-67.
84 Id. at 868.
85 Id.
86 Dietsch Field, supra note 40, at 106.
87 See Rabin, supra note 40, at 864.
88 See Stein, supra note 40, at 648.
89 Rabin, supra note 40, at 864.
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the federal cigarette labeling acts that would cause even more problems for
plaintiffs seeking to recover on warranty claims.
At this point, preemption also became a popular defense in light of the 1965
Act, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969
Act"),90 that forbade states from imposing tobacco package labeling requirements
on manufacturers. 91 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.92 began a journey that
would eventually find its way to the United States Supreme Court and mark the
end of the second wave of litigation with a disjointed ruling on the preemptive
effect of the 1965 and 1969 Acts. The Third Circuit originally addressed the
preemptive effect of the 1965 and 1969 Acts and interpreted them broadly to
include all of Cipollone's claims.93 This ruling set the stage for the United States
Supreme Court case that would mark the beginning of the contemporary era of
tobacco litigation.
C. The Contemporary Era94
The contemporary era of tobacco litigation is distinguished by two events that
set the present round of litigation apart from its predecessors.9s The first is the
battle over the preemptive effect of the 1965 and 1969 Acts. Although the United
States Supreme Court has addressed this issue, the details are far from settled and
still play a role in cases today. The second is perhaps the more important,96 but
initially had little to do with rehashing old products liability issues. Beginning
with the "Mr. Butts" document disclosures of I994,97 the tobacco industry has
fought a nearly decade-long public relations battle while inside information
90 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 73 (providing the preemptive language of both the 1965 and 1969 Acts).
92 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984), rev'd 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), on remand
649 F. Supp. 664 (D.NJ. 1986).
93 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 581-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (dismissing
plaintiff's claims for failure to warn, breach of express warranty, and intentional tort claims).
94 For a thorough history and evaluation of legal theories in the contemporary era of
tobacco litigation, see Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction,
Fraud and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465
(1998).
95 Other events, such as the advent of class actions, state Medicaid subrogation suits, and
second-hand smoke injuries are also important to the current era of tobacco litigation. However,
the vilification of the tobacco industry, and the extent to which courts use the preemptive
doctrines of Cipollone, apply to all tobacco suits in some manner.
96 See Cupp, supra note 94, at 489-90 (stating that "[niew evidence of fraud by tobacco
manufacturers is likely the most important factor distinguishing the third wave cases from
earlier litigation.").
97 See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (describing the origins of the Mr. Butts
documents).
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continues to show that the tobacco industry has known for thirty years that
cigarettes are dangerous and addictive.98
1. Cipollone, Cigarette Labeling, and Preemption
Cipollone is particularly notable for its legacy of preemption in interpreting
the 1965 and 1969 Acts. Because merchants must properly package and label
goods in order for them to be merchantable, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the 1965 and 1969 Acts is crucial to an analysis of the implied warranty of
merchantability. If plaintiffs cannot bypass the preemption issues posed by
Cipollone, then juries will never evaluate the merits of their claims and those
causes of action will fail.
Rose Cipollone, a smoker for forty-two years, contracted lung cancer and
filed suit against the Liggett Group, Inc., which had manufactured the cigarettes
she had smoked.99 After Cipollone died from lung cancer in 1984, her husband,
Antonio, continued the action as the executor of his wife's estate.1°° The
Cipollones' complaint alleged many claims, including strict liability, negligence,
breach of warranty, and intentional tort.101 After an interlocutory appeal 10 2 and a
$400,000 verdict for the Cipollones, 10 3 the Third Circuit heard the case for the
final time and affirmed the district court's finding of a broad preemptive effect for
the 1969 Act.104 The Court of Appeals found that the 1969 Act preempts "state
law damage actions" that "challenge ... the propriety of a party's actions with
respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes."'10 5 Therefore, the
"plaintiff's post-1965 failure to warn, express warranty, and intentional tort
claims"'1 6 were preempted because they were based on the "advertising and
promotion of cigarettes." 107 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari
for review. 10 8
98 See Player, supra note 40, at 322.
99 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986).
1 0Id.
101 Id at 184.
102 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187-88 (finding that Congress intended to occupy the field of
regulating tobacco package labeling with the 1969 Act and remanded the case with instructions
for the district judge to determine specifically which claims were preempted by the labeling
acts).
103 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541,546 (3d Cir. 1990).
104 Id. at 582.
105 Id.
10 6 Id at 583.
107 ad at 582.
108 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1991).
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Justice Stevens produced the most important opinion of the case, although it
did not garner a majority of the Court.109 Stevens found that the preemptive effect
of the 1969 Act barred "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" imposed by state law
relating to advertising and promotion of cigarettes,"10 and therefore the 1969 Act
would preempt most claims arising under state statutes and the common law.I I1
The key question in the analysis is "whether the legal duty that is the predicate of
the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health... imposed under State law with respect to... advertising
or promotion."' 1 2 Justice Stevens concluded that the Cipollone's claims for
failure to warn, breach of express warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation
were preempted; however, the state law conspiracy claim remained. 113 Despite
the fractured nature of the Cipollone decision, most circuits have adopted Justice
Stevens's plurality opinion. 114
2. Public Disclosure of Confidential Tobacco Industry Documents
In 1994, Merrell Williams, a paralegal with the firm of Wyatt, Tarrant, &
Combs in Louisville, Kentucky, shipped a box containing approximately 10,000
documents from Brown & Williamson Tobacco to Professor Stanton Glantz at
the University of California, San Francisco. 115 These documents contained
information indicating that the tobacco industry had known for thirty years that
smoking was dangerous and led to many illnesses. 116 Moreover, the documents
indicated that the tobacco companies manipulated the nicotine levels and
109 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Oddly, the one opinion that did receive support from seven justices
dealt with the preemptive language of the extinct section 5 of the 1965 Act. Id at 519-20
("[W]e conclude that § 5 of the 1965 [Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act] only
preempted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements
and did not pre-empt state-law damages actions."). For excerpts of the 1965 and 1969 Acts, see
supra note 73.
110 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520.
111 Id. at 522-23.
112 Id at 524 (citing section 5(b) of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
113 Id at 524-30.
114 See infra note 148 (citing the Courts of Appeals that adopted Justice Stevens' plurality
opinion from Cipollone).
115 See Player, supra note 40, at 322; see also STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE
CIGARFrEm PAPERS (1996), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/cigpapers/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002). Another useful source of tobacco documents is Tobacco Documents
Online, at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2002). The Northeastern
University School of Law provides general tobacco information through the Tobacco Control
Resource Center, Inc. and The Tobacco Products Liability Project, at
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
1 16 See Player, supra note 40, at 322.
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additives in cigarettes in order to increase their addictive nature. 117 By disclosing
these documents, Merrell Williams, known only as 'Wr. Butts,"' 18 began the
wave of public disclosure of inside information that would prove to be a public
relations disaster for the tobacco industry."19
The impact of these disclosures and the ensuing public outrage could have a
potential impact on breach of implied warranty claims. The first round of
litigation was characterized by the successful use of the unforeseeability defense.
The problem of foreseeability disappeared with the advent of the implied
warranty of merchantability in U.C.C. section 2-314, which did not require the
defendant to have foreseen the harm as a condition for imposing liability.
Although foreseeability no longer plagued plaintiffs, assumption of risk still
played a role in the U.C.C.120 In the second round of litigation, the public
sentiment remained focused on the voluntary nature of smoking and many felt the
ill-effects were the result of the smoker's poor choices.121 In the present round of
litigation, inside information revealing that tobacco companies were dealing in
nicotine addiction 122 strongly challenges the assumption that smokers are
responsible for their own behavior and goes far to establish them as victims in the
eyes of the public, and subsequently, the jury.123 Divesting tobacco companies'
ability to claim assumption of risk as a defense could signify the loss of
substantial firepower for these companies in the current era of litigation. The
implications of this shift in public sentiment are further explored in the next
section as they relate to today's use of the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of
merchantability.
117 Id
1 19 These revelations led to a new legal approach based on fraud, deceit, and conspiracy.
See Dietsch Field, supra note 40, at 122. Minnesota's state action against the tobacco industry is
an example of these new claims resulting from the disclosure of confidential tobacco industry
information. See State of Minnesota, Private Insurer Sues Tobacco Companies, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 1994, at A4. Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey m1 filed the first action of
its kind by a state alleging industry antitrust and consumer fraud violations. Id Humphrey's
comments concerning the lawsuit summarized the shift towards holding tobacco companies
responsible for their past misconduct instead of focusing on the legal quagmire of products
liability and the personal responsibility of individual smokers. Upon filing the suit, Humphrey
succinctly stated "[p]revious lawsuits have said the tobacco companies should pay because their
products are dangerous. This lawsuit says they should pay because the conduct ... is illegal."
Id
120 See WHrm & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 11-8, at 408-09.
121 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
122 See GL.AmTz, supra note 115, at 58-60.
123 See Cupp, supra note 94, at 489-90.
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IV. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILrrY AND RELATED ISSUES
FACED BY TODAY'S LITIGANTS
The successive parts of this article are intended to build on one another. First,
the implied warranty of merchantability and the general issues surrounding its
general applications are explored. Next, the note provides the history of the
tobacco cases and how implied warranty theories fared throughout the three
waves of litigation. Then, the note discusses the issues presented by the implied
warranty of merchantability and tobacco litigation as they apply to cases today.
Here, this note will identify the main issues faced by current litigants and provide
commentary concerning legal pitfalls and some useful insight on where the legal
theory is heading.
A. The Gatekeepers: The Statute of Limitations and Evolving Concepts of
Preemption
All litigants face certain dispositive and significant threshold issues that have
nothing to do with the merits of their claims or legal theories. For today's tobacco
litigants, the statute of limitations and questions of federal and state law
preemption can end a plaintiff's case before a judge even determines whether a
plaintiff has stated a proper claim or whether a jury has the opportunity to decide
the merits. Both issues initially seem relatively simple, but the way the courts
have handled these matters is not entirely intuitive. A detailed description of
today's law as it is applied to the tobacco cases follows.
1. The U.C.C. Statute of Limitations 24
If one considers the application of the implied warranty of merchantability to
the sale of an automobile, for example, the application of the statute of limitations
124 See supra Part 1.C (providing a basic description of the four-year statute of limitations
imposed under section 2-725 of the U.C.C.). Some state legislatures have enacted statutes of
repose that create an absolute bar to any action brought after the expiration of a specified period
of time. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (2001) (creating a ten-year limitation,
beginning when the product was first purchased, for recovery on personal injury claims arising
from a defective product, with the exception of asbestos and silicone breast implant injuries).
These statutes are often aimed at products liability actions and some courts find that statutes of
repose are not subject to any equitable tolling. See Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Moreover, statutes of repose are generally
constitutional, even though they bar causes of action before they accrue. Id. Although the
Greene court did not specifically apply the Tennessee rule of repose to warranty claims, the
issue may be applicable to tobacco cases. In Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230
F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the
Supreme Court of Alabama regarding the applicability of its statute of repose to tobacco
liability cases. Id at 1312. The Supreme Court of Alabama has yet to issue its opinion.
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is simple-buyers must bring suit for the breach of the implied warranty within
four years of the date of tender of delivery. 125 Thus, if buyers discover a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, then they must bring suit within four
years from the time they take physical possession of their car, or they are barred
by the statute of limitations. Cigarettes, on the other hand, provide a more
complex issue. For individuals who have smoked countless cigarettes over their
lifetimes, it would be impossible to determine which sales of cigarettes
proximately caused the smokers' respective diseases. Furthermore, if one could
determine which cigarettes resulted in injury, it is likely that all claims would be
barred because the disease would likely not manifest itself until after the four-year
period for bringing suit. To cope with this difficult situation and ensure that
plaintiffs still have an opportunity to bring a timely claim upon discovering their
smoking-related illness, the courts have fashioned different methods of applying
the U.C.C.'s four-year statute of limitations.
Of the courts that have addressed the statute of limitations concerning
tobacco-related claims, most conclude that the cause of action for a breach of
implied warranty accrues when the plaintiff last purchased cigarettes
manufactured by the particular defendant. 126 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the U.C.C. statute of limitations as it applies to smoking-related claims
in Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 127 Allgood was a lifetime smoker of
forty-eight years beginning in 1941 with "Camel" cigarettes manufactured by RJ.
Reynolds. 128 No later than 1956, Allgood switched to the "Pall Mall" brand of
cigarettes manufactured by American Tobacco. 129 Allgood contracted lung
cancer and died in 1989, and his wife filed suit in 1991.130 The trial court noted
that Allgood's claims concerning R.J. Reynolds were barred by the U.C.C. statute
of limitations because a breach of implied warranty occurred on tender of delivery
and Allgood never alleged in his pleadings that he purchased cigarettes
manufactured by R.J. Reynolds after 1956, well outside the statutory four-year
period.131 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's reasoning
concerning the statute of limitations. The Court noted "[u]nder Texas law,
125 As to merchants, tender of delivery occurs when then buyer is in physical possession
of the goods, unless the parties agree otherwise. U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (2000).
126 It is important to note that plaintiffs often join several tobacco manufacturers because
they have smoked several brands of cigarettes manufactured by several different tobacco
companies. Thus, plaintiffs should be careful in their pleadings not to bring claims for a breach
of warranty against a specific manufacturer if the plaintiffs have not smoked that particular
manufacturer's products within the four years prior to the lawsuit.
127 80 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1996).
12 8 Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. H-91-0158, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20932, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1994).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at* "18-22.
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warranty claims accrue on the date of sale and the statute of limitations extends
for four years."' 132 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. 133
At least one other court has reached a different position. In Shropshire v.
American Tobacco Co.,134 the court held that the cause of action accrued at the
time the plaintiff learned he had a smoking-related illness. 135 Shropshire, a
lifetime smoker from his teenage years, was diagnosed with Beurger's disease in
1973.136 At the time of the diagnosis, Shropshire's doctors advised him that
smoking was a likely cause of the injury and advised him to quit.137 Although
Shropshire heeded that advice, he resumed smoking in 1980 and his health
deteriorated considerably, resulting in a lawsuit.138 While the Tennessee Court of
Appeals acknowledged the general rule in Tennessee regarding tender of delivery
as the date the action accrues, 139 the court nonetheless held that the statute of
limitations contained in U.C.C. section 2-725 began to run in 1973 when
Shropshire learned of his smoking-related illnesses. 14 In making its holding, the
court particularly noted Shropshire's affirmative knowledge that he had an injury
related to smoking in 1973 and yet failed to take action; therefore, the statute of
limitations barred his recovery. 141
132 Algood, 80 F.3d at 171.
133 See, e.g., Floyd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 159 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831
(E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Since there are no allegations in the Complaint that plaintiff purchased or
smoked cigarettes after 1989, the Court holds that the limitations period for a breach of implied
warranty ran in 1993, and plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claim is therefore barred.");
Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d 539, 550-51 (D. Md. 1997)
(involving a second-hand smoke case where the plaintiff failed to allege that the cigarettes
which harmed him were purchased within the four-year limitations period); Am. Tobacco Co.
v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 435 (Tex. 1997) ("The four-year statute of limitations on implied
warranties began to run at the time of delivery, not when Grinnell discovered he had cancer.").
134 No. 1143, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1988).
135 Id. at *5--6.
136 Id. at *2.
137 Id at *2-3.
138 Id.
139 Id. at *5-6 (citing McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491
(Tenn. 1975)).
140 Shropshire v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 1143, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250, *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1988).
141 Id. Courts will often haggle over discovery issues relating to latent diseases and
whether plaintiffs either knew or should have known of their injury. Here, Shropshire's
physicians specifically informed him that his injuries were smoking-related, and he took no
action against the manufacturers for twelve years. In fact, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted
that their application of U.C.C. section 2-725 was somewhat lenient compared to other
discovery rules which begin the statutory period even when the plaintiff may not know of all
the possible adverse affects of the injury. Id. at *7.
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Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was willing to apply Texas law
concerning the statute of limitations in Allgood, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently decided to certify this question, among others, to the
Alabama Supreme Court for resolution in Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.142 The Eleventh Circuit noted that several tests may apply to determining
when a cause of action accrues, especially in the context of tort claims. 143 The
court ultimately determined that this state-law decision was best left to the
Alabama Supreme Court,144 which has yet to issue its opinion.
Plaintiffs have attempted, albeit in vain, to convince the courts to adopt an
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as it applies to breach of warranty
cases. A Maryland district court has held that equitable principles commonly
applied to discovery of tort claims are inapplicable to suits for a breach of
warranty arising under the U.C.C. 4 5 Rather, "'§ 2-725 means just what it says: a
warranty action must be brought within four years of the tender of the goods
forming the basis of the warTanty." 146 Therefore, plaintiffs should not expect
tremendous success in convincing a court to apply equitable principles to U.C.C.
section 2-725.
2. Cipollone and Its Progeny
Despite the seemingly inconclusive opinion rendered by the Supreme Court
in Cipollone,147 most courts have followed Justice Stevens's plurality opinion
interpreting the current version of the 1969 Act and its preemptive language. 148 In
142 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000).
14 3 Id. at 1305-06. The Spain court noted:
The Alabama Supreme Court has yet to address statute of limitations issues in the context
of a cigarette products liability case, and it is uncertain whether the "completed wrong"
sufficient to begin the running of the applicable limitations period occurs at the time of
addiction to cigarette smoking, the time of the last exposure to cigarette smoke, the time a
smoking-related illness or injury is diagnosed, or some other time.
Il
144 Id. at 1306-07, 1312 (citation omitted). Spain explores many common issues facing
tobacco litigants today, and the Court of Appeals certified many of those questions to the
Alabama Supreme Court. Thus, Spain is likely to become a leading case in contemporary
tobacco litigation.
145 Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 550-51 (D. Md.
1997).
146 Id. (quoting Mills v. Int'l Harvester Co., 554 F. Supp. 611,612 (D. Md. 1982)).
147 See supra Part III.C.1.
148 See Jones v. Vilsack, 272 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001); Spain, 230 F.3d at 1304-
05; Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 347-49 (6th Cir. 2000); Lindsey v.
Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't., 195 F.3d 1065, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2000); Philip Morris,
Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1997); Allgood, 80 F.3d at 171 (preempting
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Cipollone, Justice Stevens proposed the following test for determining whether
the 1969 Act preempts a state law imposed on the tobacco industry:
The central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask whether the legal duty
that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a
"requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under
State law with respect to ... advertising or promotion," giving that clause a fair
but narrow reading. As discussed below, each phrase within that clause limits the
universe of common-law claims pre-empted by the statute. 149
Section 2-314 of the U.C.C. lists several minimum requirements that an item
must fulfill in order to be merchantable.150 Among them is the requirement that
goods must be properly labeled and packaged. When plaintiffs allege that
cigarettes are not merchantable because they are not properly labeled or
packaged, they run into problems.
Most courts have little difficulty holding that the plurality opinion in
Cipollone places any claim concerning packaging and labeling in direct conflict
with section 5(b) of the 1969 Act.15' More specifically, courts will address the
certain claims with a citation to Stevens's plurality opinion); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d
1316, 1322 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We recognize that Cipollone was decided by a plurality of the
Supreme Court. We are satisfied that the pre-emption discussion and holding represents the
Court's current pre-emption analysis."); Magnus v. Fortune Brands, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 217,
222 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Shaw, 973 F. Supp. at 544-45; Griesenbeck v. Am. Tobacco Co., 897 F.
Supp. 815, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1995); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515,
1518-21 (D. Kan. 1995).
149 Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523-24 (1992) (involving a plurality
opinion that quotes portions of section 5(b) of the 1969 Act). Judge Gershon in Magnus v.
Fortune Brands, Inc. interpreted Justice Stevens's analysis as a four part test, stating:
the Court devised the following test for determining whether a common law claim is
preempted pursuant to the statute: Preemption is required whenever the predicate legal
duty underlying the claim constitutes a(l) [sic] requirement or prohibition, (2) based on
smoking and health, (3) imposed under state law, (4) with respect to the advertising or
promotion of cigarettes.
Magnus, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
150 See supra Part Il.A.2.
151 See Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194 (D. Mass.
2000):
To the extent that Johnson's claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is
based on the alleged failure to warn about the health effects of cigarettes [by including
sufficient safety instructions in the packaging], it relies on a state-law requirement that
B[rown] & W[illiamson] include statements regarding the relationship between smoking
and health in its advertising.... Johnson's breach of warranty claim based on failure to
warn is therefore preempted by the 1969 Act.
Id at 202; see also Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d 775, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(stating that "so much of [the plaintiffs'] causes of action to recover damages for ... implied
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pleadings and the way plaintiffs allege the breach of warranty. To the extent that
the pleadings show a claim based on improper labeling and packaging, the courts
find preemption. In the alternative, if the plaintiff further alleges a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability based on some sort of defect, then the court
will likely not find preemption as such claims have nothing to do with advertising
and promotion of cigarettes. 152 Keeping in mind that U.C.C. section 2-314(2)
provides a list of minimum requirements, the plaintiff need only show that the
cigarettes do not meet one of the requirements listed in the statute. Therefore,
plaintiffs should avoid section 2-314(2)(e), which addresses packaging of goods,
and instead focus their allegations on the application of section 2-314(2)(a)-(d),
which apply to the specific defects of the cigarette itself.
Finally, the practitioner should be aware that a few courts take positions that
are at the ends of the preemption spectrum as opposed to the middle ground
achieved by most courts. In Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,153 a
Texas district court found that common law claims, including implied warranty
claims, are completely preempted by Cipollone because such claims are
"predicated on duties based on smoking and health." 154 In a later proceeding
warranty of merchantability... [that] are based on ... the neutralization through advertising of
Federally-mandated warnings... are preempted").
152 In the alternative, courts often find that implied warranty claims survive a preemptive
analysis under Cipollone because the plaintiff's allegations focus on the defective nature of the
goods and not problems with labeling, warning, advertising, or promotion. See McLean v.
Philip Morris, Inc., Nos. 2:96CV167-DF, 5:97CV-117, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13551, at *32-
34 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1999) ("'he Plaintiffs' breach of implied warranty claims are not
preempted to the extent they are unrelated to advertising and promotion."); Labelle v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., C.A. No. 2:98-3235-23, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21629, at *18-19
(D.S.C. Mar. 19, 1999) ("Therefore, plaintiffs' claim for breach of implied warranty would not
be pre-empted to the extent that it is based on something other than the failure to disclose
information related to health and smoking .... ); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp.
1425, 1434 (E.D. La. 1994) ("The Court finds that the duty imposed under the implied warranty
[of merchantability] is not one 'based on advertising and promotion.' It is based instead on
defendants' manufacture and sale of the cigarettes ... regardless of whether defendants
advertise or promote them."); Appavoo v. Phillip Morris Inc., No. 122469/97, 1998 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 220, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 1998) ("A breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability is based on the general warranty that a product is fit for us, and thus is
independent of 'advertising or promotion.' Accordingly, this claim is not preempted under the
test set forth in Cipollone.").
153 No. C-97-070, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7346 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1997).
154 Id. at *9. The district court further based its reasoning on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996). The Perez court
concluded that the Fifth Circuit had found all claims based on implied warranties, inter alia,
were preempted under Cipollone. Perez, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7346, at *9. Your author has
scoured the Allgood decision and is at a loss to find where the Fifth Circuit addressed implied
warranties and federal preemption. The Allgood court quite clearly disposed of the warranty
against the cigarette manufacturers using the statute of limitations. Allgood, 80 F.3d. at 171. At
least one other court disagrees with reading Allgood as having a broad preemptive effect. See
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concerning Perez, the district court further held that "[b]asically, Plaintiffs'
claim[] of ... breach of implied warranties [is a] claim[] alleging that the
Defendants misrepresented and concealed the health risks of cigarette smoking.
The Court FINDS [sic] that all of these claims ... stem from duties based on
smoking and health [and are therefore barred]."'155 Although this is a harsh
approach to the Cipollone preemption issue, it also appears to be somewhat
unique. The cases following the middle ground tend to dominate.
3. A New Form of Preemption: State Products Liability Laws
Just when it appeared plaintiffs were safe from the preemptive effects of
Cipollone with respect to allegations that cigarettes are not fit for their ordinary
purposes, a new form of preemption has surfaced that has the potential to derail
warranty claims. In varying ways, state legislatures have sought to codify their
products liability law. 156 Some statutes purport to combine all actions resulting in
personal injury under tort claims for strict products liability. This proposition can
create an enormous problem for plaintiffs as the language of these statutes
appears to deny them a claim under the state's warranty law. Cases from Texas
and Ohio provide an illustration.
The Texas Products Liability Act ('TPLA") sets out the requirements for
determining whether a plaintiff can recover for personal injury resulting from use
of a manufactured product. Any attempt to recover for personal injury using a
breach of implied warranty claim, inter alia, is considered a "products liability
action" under the TPLA. 157 Furthermore, the Texas legislature went on to declare
that manufacturers in a "products liability action," which necessarily involves any
claim for personal injury resulting from a breach of implied warranty, cannot be
LaBelle, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21629, at *18 ("Defendants first cite Allgood as a case in
which a claim for breach of implied warranty was pre-empted-however, Allgood did nothing
of the kind. The warranty claims at issue in Allgood were dismissed for the following separate
reasons: ... [they] were barred by the statute of limitations.").
155 Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 967 F. Supp. 920, 928 (S.D. Tex.
1997).
156 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71-.80 (Anderson 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-101 to -108 (2000); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001-.006 (Vernon
1997).
157 TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(2). This definition of a products
liability action seemingly throws the concept of implied warranty into the world of products
liability on tort and re-works the U.C.C. framework for recovering damages. Note that sellers
can recover for personal injury resulting from breach of warranty under the U.C.C. See U.C.C.
§ 2-715 (2)(b) (2001) (allowing for recovery of consequential damages related to breach of
warranty). The Texas statute, however, seems to require anyone seeking recovery for personal
injury to bring his claims under the products liability statute, thus cutting off the plaintiff's
ability to recover damages for personal injury under the U.C.C. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 82.001-.006.
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liable if the product is commonly known to be inherently unsafe and the product
is a common consumer good, like tobacco. 158 The result is that anyone seeking to
assert an implied warranty claim based on injuries suffered from smoking
cigarettes must contend with the requirements of the TPLA. The following cases
provide the judicial interpretations as they apply to tobacco litigation.
Although a textual reading of the TPLA would seem to preempt any attempt
to recover for personal injuries resulting from smoking under the U.C.C., the
Texas courts have generally found that the implied warranty of merchantability,
as it relates to the unknown dangers of nicotine addiction, survives the preemptive
analysis. In McLean v. Philip Morris, Inc.,159 a Texas district court found that the
TPLA did not require plaintiffs seeking recovery for a breach of U.C.C. section
2-314 to limit their claims to those allowed by the TPLA. Rather, the plaintiff's
claim survived to the extent it alleged a defective condition of cigarettes in
relation to the unknown dangers of nicotine addiction. 160
The Ohio Products Liability Act ("OPLA")161 provides a statute with a
similar concept as that of the TPLA. Like Texas, the Ohio statute defines a
"product liability claim" as a civil action seeking recovery of damages for
personal injury and property damage resulting from, inter alia, "[a]ny failure of
158 § 82.004(a). This section states that products manufacturers will not be liable if:
(1) the product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge to the
community; and
(2) the product is a common consumer product intended for personal consumption,
such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as identified in Comment i to Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Id It is also important to note that while claims based on express warranties are "products
liability actions," plaintiffs are not bound by the requirements in section 82.004(a). Id
§ 82.004(b).
159 McLean v. Philip Morris, Inc., Nos. 2:96CV167-DF, 5:97CV-117, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13551 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1999).
160 Id. at *40, 43. Contra Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. C-97-070,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7346 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1997). in Perez, a Texas district court
specifically concluded that the definition of "products liability action" included claims for
breach of implied warranty and thus the plaintiff was barred from recovery because it was
common knowledge that cigarettes were inherently dangerous and they were a common
consumer product. Id. at *10-11. It is also interesting to note that the plaintiff claimed that the
breach of implied warranty "sound[ed] in contract [but] ... the statute falls with[in] the title
'Liability in Tort."' Id. at *10. The court had little problem with this distinction and instead
concluded that the definition of "products liability action" was sufficiently broad to cover any
action against a manufacturer resulting in personal injury. Id. at *10-11. Therefore plaintiffs
would be in error if they looked to the U.C.C. for a remedy to personal injury for a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. In this way, the preemptive effect of the TPLA seems
anything but certain.
161 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71-.80 (Anderson 2001).
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that product to conform to any relevant representation or warTanty."'I6 2 Also like
Texas, any Ohio plaintiff asserting a "products liability claim" must contend with
restrictions outlined in the remainder of the OPLA. 163
One crucial difference between Ohio and Texas derives from the judicial
interpretations of the respective acts. While Texas refrains from a literal
interpretation of the TPLA preemptive language, the Ohio courts appear to take
an opposite approach. In Nadel v. Burger King Corp.,164 the Ohio Court of
Appeals found that the language of the OPLA preempted any recovery for
personal injury under the implied warranty theories of the-U.C.C. The plaintiffs,
claiming damages for second-degree burns resulting from spilled coffee
purchased at a fast-food franchise, alleged in part that the coffee was not
merchantable under section 2-314 of the U.C.C.165 After examining previous
holdings 166 and the language of the OPLA,167 the court concluded that "claims
for personal injuries caused by a product's failure to conform due to a defect is
governed solely by the Products Liability Law [OPLA]. ' 168 Thus, it appears that
the Ohio courts generally will find that any claim to recover damages for personal
and property injury must be brought in accordance with the OPLA.169 Needless
162 Id. § 2307.7 1(M)(3) (defining a "products liability claim").
163 See id. § 2307.72 (limiting recoverable damages); § 2307.73 (requiring plaintiffs to
show a product defect in order to recover).
164 695 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
165 Id. at 1187-88. The reader should also note that Ohio has not adopted a form of
numbering its statutes that is consistent with the standard printing of the U.C.C. Although
identical to U.C.C. section 2-314, Ohio's version is found at section 1302.27 of the Ohio
Revised Code.
166 See Saylor v. Providence Hosp., 680 N.E.2d 193, 196 n.8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that breach of warranty claims are governed by the OPLA).
167 The court first noted that section 2307.73(A) of the Ohio Revised Code required
plaintiffs to establish a defective condition of the product when bringing a "products liability
claim" and then reviewed the definition of a "products liability claim," which included any
action to recover compensatory damages for, inter alia, a failure to conform to any warranty.
Nadel, 695 N.E.2d at 1190.
168 /d.
169 Although Ohio courts have not addressed the application of U.C.C. section 2-314 to
cigarettes, they have applied the preemptive effect of the OPLA to common law claims against
the tobacco companies. Most recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed what it
believed to be the common law implied warranty of merchantability under Ohio law, and found
that it survived the preemptive effect of the OPLA. In Tompkin v. American Brands, 219 F.3d
566,575 (6th Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals first found that the Ohio Supreme Court declared
that the OPLA only preempted those causes of action that were specifically stated in the OPLA.
Carrel v. Allied Products Corp., 677 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ohio 1997). Despite the Ohio Supreme
Court's declaration that the common law tort theory of implied warranty of merchantability had
merged with the strict products liability claims in Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267,
270 (Ohio 1977), the Sixth Circuit elected to follow an Ohio Court of Appeals decision, White
v. DePuy, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 450,456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998), both declaring that the common law
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to say, the extent to which states have codified their products liability laws, and
the ensuing interpretations of such laws, will govern how plaintiffs approach their
claims in certain jurisdictions. If Ohio is a representative example, some states are
moving in a direction that will allow recovery only for personal and property
damage for tort claims under state law governing products liability actions. 170
B. Merchantability as a Matter of Law
Bringing a timely action and surviving a preemptive analysis under both
Cipollone and state products liability law represents a major hurdle for tobacco
litigants. If plaintiffs survive this far, they must also properly allege a claim for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability to survive a judgment on the
pleadings and potentially proceed to the promised land of a jury trial. The
essential element of a tobacco litigation claim is whether the plaintiff alleges a
sufficient defect in cigarettes. The following cases explore the nuances that courts
tort of breach of implied warranty of merchantability survived the OPLA and reversing the
district court's dismissal of this claim. Tompkin, 219 F.3d at 575-76. This holding is
particularly troubling when considering that other courts applying Ohio law have concluded
that the common law implied warranty of merchantability no longer exists in light of the Ohio
Supreme Court's ruling in Temple. See Worthington v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
No. C-2-97-261, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23302, at *25-27 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1998); Hollar
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 794, 807-08 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
The Tompkin decision remains, although it is not entirely clear how the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals would treat an implied warranty of merchantability claim brought under section
2-314 of the U.C.C. The language of Ohio Revised Code section 2307.71(M)(3) deems any
attempt to recover under any warranty theory a "products liability claim" without distinguishing
between theories in tort versus theories in contract under the U.C.C. However, it would appear
that the Ohio Supreme Court will have to clarify the meaning of section 2301.71(M) or the
Ohio General Assembly must specifically state that the OPLA preempts U.C.C. section 2-314
in order to convince the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that the OPLA preempts recovery under
all warranty theories.
170The question that remains is what is left of U.C.C. section 2-715, which governs
recovery of damages for breach of warranty. In Ohio, recovery for personal and property
damage under the U.C.C. seemingly does not survive the OPLA; recovery for loss of the
buyer's bargain and other consequential damages apparently does. For example, if a sole
proprietor's delivery truck breaks down as a result of an unmerchantable transmission, and the
owner suffers damages from the non-delivery of merchandise, then this would not be a claim
for personal or property damage, and the plaintiff would not be bound by the OPLA. According
to section 2-715, the buyer of the truck is entitled to recover both for the defective transmission
(the difference between the actual transmission and the transmission as warranted) and the loss
of profits suffered as a result. See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 36, § 7.9, at 7:64. However, the
plaintiff is subject to U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(a), which limits recovery of consequential
damages to those foreseeable to both parties at the time of contracting. See, e.g., Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Court of Exchequer 1854). Thus, the plaintiff would have to
show that the loss resulting in the non-delivery of the goods was foreseeable to the seller of the
delivery truck at the time of contracting.
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have developed in this regard. With the added twist of the Cigarette Papers and
other inside disclosures, 171 new questions have arisen that challenge the meaning
of merchantability with respect to what the public has known about cigarettes and
health during the last fifty years. These issues are explored below. 172
Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.17 3 stands for the proposition
that a complaint merely stating that cigarettes are unmerchantable under U.C.C.
section 2-314 because their use results in disease is not a sufficient defect. 174 In
his complaint, Spain alleged that cigarettes were not merchantable under the
U.C.C. because they were unreasonably dangerous. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Alabama law makes a notable distinction between claims
alleged in tort and those brought in contract under the U.C.C. 175 Although
plaintiffs may advance a products liability theory for their claims relating to the
carcinogenic effects of smoking, they have no claim in a pure commercial sense
under U.C.C. section 2-314 that cigarettes are unmerchantable. 176 Therefore, in
171 See supra Part IIH.C.2; see also Jones v. Am. Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710-
14 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (outlining the plaintiffs' complaint that gave a chronology of seemingly
sinister behavior from the tobacco industry).
172 Before continuing, the reader should understand that the majority of tobacco cases will
be handled in the federal courts because the tobacco defendant generally seeks removal from
state courts on diversity grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). Thus, the majority of tobacco cases
are governed by federal judges applying their interpretations of state law with the occasional
certification of issues to the relevant state supreme court. See, e.g., Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
173 230 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2000) (applying Alabama law).
174 Id. at 1310-11.
175 Id. at 1310 (citing Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So. 2d 569, 571 (Ala. 1986)). The Shell
case provides an important analysis of the difference between a tort claim involving a products
liability action and one involving recovery in contract under the U.C.C. In Shell, the plaintiff
came into contact with benzene, a chemical known to cause leukemia after prolonged exposure.
Shell, 489 So. 2d at 570. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that benzene was not merchantable
under U.C.C. section 2-314 because it was unreasonably dangerous. The court first noted that
the plaintiff's claim that benzene was unreasonably dangerous was clearly a products liability
claim sounding in tort and not a proper claim in contract under the U.C.C. Id. at 571. The
implied warranty of merchantability under the U.C.C. was one of commercial standards;
therefore, if the benzene was fit for commercial use, then it was merchantable. To hold
otherwise would "ignore[] the clear distinction between causes of action arising under tort law
and those arising under the U.C.C. as adopted in Alabama." Id. For additional thoughts on the
schism between contract and tort law, see infra note 215.
176 Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 (11th Cir.
2000). For other cases following the concepts outlined in Spain, see Green v. An Tobacco Co.,
409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (adopting Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 110 (5th Cir.
1968) (reasoning that cigarettes are not defective and do not breach any warranties of
merchantability)); Tompkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 70, 94 (N.D.N.Y.
2000); Arkansas Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
936, 945 (E.D. Ark. 1999) ("[l]t is plaintiffs claim that a typical cigarette, like all cigarettes, is
'generally defective.' This type of allegation cannot state a claim for breach of implied warranty
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order for plaintiffs to allege a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
under section 2-314, they must state that the cigarettes "were commercially unfit
or unsuitable for smoking."' 177 This interpretation of merchantability is a
considerably higher standard for plaintiffs to achieve because they cannot rely on
the link between smoking and health to allege that cigarettes are unmerchantable.
Other courts take a broader view of what is merchantable and will allow
claims under U.C.C. section 2-314 to survive a judgment on the pleadings so long
as plaintiffs allege some defect with cigarettes, regardless of whether it points to a
problem of commercial fitness or unreasonable danger. In Wright v. Brooke
Group Ltd.,178 the plaintiff survived a 12(b)(6) motion under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by alleging that the defendant's cigarettes were unmerchantable
under section 2-314 of the U.C.C. because they were carcinogenic and
addictive. 179 When compared with the preceding logic in Spain, it seems the mere
allegation of a carcinogenic effect is not a sufficient defect creating a breach of
section 2-314. Other courts, however, have reached conclusions similar to Wright
and have allowed plaintiffs to proceed to discovery on the theory that cigarettes
are defective not because they are commercially unfit to smoke, but because they
result in great personal injury.' 80
of merchantability."); LaBelle v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 2:98-3235-23, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21629, at *32-39 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 1999); Little v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., No. 2:98-18979-23, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, *26-32 (D.S.C. Mar. 3,
1999); Watkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 98-130, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23328, at *
6-7 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 14, 1998); and Semowich v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d 976, 979-80 (N.D.N.Y 1988).
177 Spain, 230 F.3d at 1310. Spain is currently awaiting response to several certified
questions from the Alabama Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit certified five questions and
"invited" the Alabama Supreme Court to notify it if the court was incorrect in a number of its
conclusions reached in Spain. The Eleventh Circuit requested comment, although not
certification, on the issue of whether cigarettes were merchantable under section 2-314 of the
U.C.C. Id. at 1312.
178 114 F. Supp. 2d 797 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
17 9 Id. at 828. The Wright court held:
Mr. Wright's breach of an implied warranty claim survives to the extent that it is based on
specific allegations that defendants knowingly designed, manufactured [sic] and
distributed a product which they knew was both carcinogenic and addictive and, thus, not
fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended. Additionally, plaintiffs' allegation
that the manipulative enhancement of the nicotine level in tobacco in order to induce
addiction could possibly prove that the product was defective and, thus, not fit for the
ordinary purpose for which it was intended.
Id. (citations omitted).
180 For cases following the reasoning of Wright, see Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d
1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194,
207 (D. Mass. 2000); Magnus v. Fortune Brands, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 96-0459-CV-W-3, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21990, at *28 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 1999); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp.
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As this note indicates in earlier sections, the way that the public views the
current round of tobacco litigation has been altered profoundly through the public
disclosure of documents that reveal the tobacco companies' alleged deceptive
practices of manipulating nicotine levels to induce addiction. 181 This new
wrinkle, which includes a general re-evaluation of what the public has known
concerning smoking in the context of nicotine addiction, manifests itself in how
some courts define merchantability. In American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell,1 82
the Supreme Court of Texas outlined the issue in basic form. In determining
whether an implied warranty exists with respect to the harmful effects of
smoking, the court found that no warranty claim exists when a plaintiff merely
alleges that cigarettes are harmful because the common, public knowledge about
the general ill-effects of smoking negates the existence of the warranty.' 83 Thus,
the court found that a claim alleging that cigarettes were defective because they
had a negative impact on health was insufficient. However, the court noted that
the dangers of nicotine addiction did not properly fit within the concept of
common knowledge as it relates to the general health effects of smoking. 184 In
this way, the Supreme Court of Texas acknowledged that the manipulation of
nicotine levels and the resulting addiction are new cigarette defects that were
previously unavailable to plaintiffs but now state sufficient claims for the breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability. 185
The line, not surprisingly, is therefore drawn between those courts that see the
ill-effects of smoking as a defect and those that do not. Twenty years ago, it
would have seemed only a matter of time before courts found themselves in a
position with plaintiffs who could not possibly claim that they did not know
smoking was dangerous. Times have changed. The public in general, and courts
in particular, seem more likely to listen to plaintiffs who articulate their position
1425, 1434 (E.D. La. 1994); Kyte v. Philip Morris, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1029-30 (Mass.
1990); and Am Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420,435 (Tex. 1997).
181 See supra Part ll.C.2.
182 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
18 3 Id at 435 (refusing to recognize a claim for the implied warranty of merchantability
when the public's common knowledge of the general risks of smoking show no expectation
that cigarettes are safe).
184 Id.
185 Other courts note this difference as well. See Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d
596, 603 (7th Cir. 2000) ("There is a considerable difference between knowing that smoking is
bad and knowing that smoking is addictive...."); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp.
2d 797, 810-17 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (noting only common public knowledge exists of a general
link between health and smoking and refusing to take judicial notice that specific risks, such as
addiction, were not publicly known at the time plaintiff began smoking); see also DEP'T OF
HEALTHt & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCEs OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICION,
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988) (providing the Surgeon General's first report on
nicotine and addiction, almost twenty-five years after the first report describing the health
effects of smoking in 1964).
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with respect to the specific nature of their cigarette-related injury. 186 Alleging a
blanket claim that only invokes the general health risk of smoking is a risky
approach for plaintiffs claiming a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. Offering the specifics of the claim, especially with respect to the
addictive nature and resulting harm from that addiction, will likely garner more
positive treatment for plaintiffs by the courts.
C. Current Issues on Defenses
1. Assumption of Risk
Official Comment 13 to section 2-314 of the U.C.C. states that it is necessary
to show "that the breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss
sustained." 187 Since warranty law draws its origins from both tort and contract
law, the concept of proximate cause will be borrowed from a jurisdiction's tort
law to determine if a breach of warranty has proximately caused injuries to
plaintiffs. 188 Thus, if plaintiffs have knowingly encountered the dangers resulting
186 S.F. Jury Tightens Noose on Big Tobacco, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1999, at A24
(reporting a $50 million jury award against Philip Morris and quoting the jury foreman as
saying "[tlhis jury as a whole was very angry at the cigarette companies."); David Stout, Justice
Dept. Plans Tobacco Suit Seeking Billions in Health Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1999, at Al
(noting that the tobacco industry's image has suffered tremendously, especially in the wake of
tobacco executives testifying under oath that there was no link between smoking and ill-health).
In 1994, several tobacco executives testified before a Congressional subcommittee concerning
smoking and health. Dubbed the "Waxman Hearings," the executives proceeded to deny any
affirmative link between smoking and health and expressed no belief that nicotine is addictive.
Regulation of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the House Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 103rd Cong. 542-628, 640-767,
791-844 (1994) (reporting testimony of tobacco industry leaders concerning nicotine and
addiction). But see, THE GALLUP POLL: PuBLIc OPINIoN 1999 277 (George Gallup, Jr. ed.,
2000) This Gallup Poll found somewhat mixed feelings about the plight of smokers among
those polled. Fifty-five percent believed that smokers were mostly to blame for their problem,
but 30% believed the cigarette companies were mostly to blame (an increase of 5% from 1994)
and 13% felt smokers and the tobacco industry shared the blame equally. lI In terms of the
Federal Government's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, 51% supported the action while
42% opposed. Id.
187 See CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 36, § 7.9, at 7.64 ("As is true in the law generally,
only if the breach of warranty is a proximate cause of a compensable injury will the buyer have
a cause of action against the seller. This is primarily an issue of consequential damages [such as
smoking-related illness].") (footnote omitted).
188 E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk as Defense
to Action for Personal Injury, Death, or Property Damage Resulting From Alleged Breach of
Implied Warranty, 4 A.L.R. 3d 501, 502 (1965) ("Actions for alleged breach of implied
warranty are often held to be part of the law of contracts. However, such actions were formerly
regarded as sounding in tort, and they retain certain aspects of the law of torts."); see also
Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock Shops of Hollywood, 449 S.W.2d 692, 693-94 (Ark. 1970)
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from an alleged breach of implied warranty, then the breach has not proximately
caused their injuries. 189
A thorough analysis of the assumption of risk defense, as it specifically
relates to U.C.C. section 2-314, is curiously absent from the reported tobacco
cases. Grinnel1190 comes close in its analysis of the public's common knowledge
of smoking dangers, but then reasons that such knowledge lends itself to negating
the mere existence of an implied warranty. 19 1 The assumption of risk defense
does not aim to negate the existence-or even refute an alleged breach-of an
implied warranty, but only seeks to show that buyers are actually the proximate
cause of their injuries because they used the product despite knowing its dangers.
Although the tobacco case law is somewhat bare on the subject, the most
logical indicator of potential success for the assumption of risk defense is the
extent to which a particular court, and possibly a jury, pays heed to the "common
(finding that a pair of trousers could not have proximately caused plaintiffs injury because a
brown recluse spider was hiding in them); Jacqueline S. Bollas, Note, Use of the Comparative
Negligence Doctrine in Warranty Actions, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 771-75 (1984) (describing the
evolution of comparative negligence and proximate cause issues as they relate to warranty
actions).
189 See Monsanto Co. v. Logisticon, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(using the tort concept of assumption of risk in order to determine if damages proximately
caused by a breach of warranty are recoverable under U.C.C. section 2-715). "[Dlamages
which have been caused by the continued use of a defective article, after the buyer has become
aware that it does not conform to warranty, are not recoverable in an action or a counterclaim
based on breach of warranty." Id. (footnote omitted); Gillespie v. Am. Motors Corp., 317
S.E.2d 32, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and
could not maintain a claim for breach of warranty after he continued to drive a car for three
years with knowledge that the car emitted noxious fumes in the passenger area); see also
Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Labs., Inc., 661 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (6th Cir. 1981). Upjohn applies
Michigan law and analyzes the effect of the plaintiffs' behavior on their ability to recover for a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314 of the U.C.C. The
Upjohn court states:
Thus, considering the facts in the case at bar we think it no more than an exercise in
semantics to quibble over whether the actions of the appellants amounted to an
abandonment of their reliance on the seller's implied warranty .... The important factor
under either theory or an amalgam of them is that ... the breach is no longer considered
'the proximate cause of the loss.' U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 13. That is, the defect... of
which the plaintiffs had knowledge, could no longer be relied upon by them as a basis for
an action of breach of warranty.
Id at 1109 (quoting Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d 317, 327 (6th Cir. 1971)).
190 Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
191 Id. at 435 (citing Official Comment 1 to section 2.313 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code (corresponding to U.C.C. section 2-313), which explains that implied
warranties "rest so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no particular
language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation unless
unmistakably negated.").
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
knowledge" doctrine. The common knowledge doctrine is a concept by which
defendants seek to convince courts that cigarettes are not defective because the
public perception of smoking is such that ill health is associated with cigarettes
and therefore that no defect exists. 192 This doctrine receives its most thorough
treatment as it relates to plaintiffs' claims based on strict products liability in
tort. 193 If courts believe that it is common knowledge that smoking is dangerous
as it relates to the product liability theory, it is only a short step for courts to find
that plaintiffs have assumed the risks associated with smoking and thus cannot
show any alleged beach of merchantability as a proximate cause of their injuries.
The issue, then, appears to revolve around whether the courts or juries will
find that the health risks related to smoking are in fact common knowledge to the
public at large. As to this question, there is no consensus in the law. Many judges
simply evaluate the history of cigarettes in America and take judicial notice of
common knowledge. 194 As a matter of law, this result generally bars plaintiffs
from claiming that cigarettes are in some way defective because of their
damaging effect on health. Other courts, however, evaluate the history of tobacco
and soundly refuse to take such judicial notice of the common knowledge
doctrine as it relates to cigarettes. 195
192 Guilbeault v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 84 F. Supp. 2d 263, 269-75 (D.R.I. 2000)
(providing a thorough evaluation of the common knowledge doctrine as it relates to smoking
and strict products liability).
193 Id.
194 Id at 274 ("This Court is satisfied that, after the extensive publicity surrounding the
1964 Advisory Committee Report's unequivocal conclusion that smoking causes cancer, all
reasonable consumers should be charged with this knowledge."); see also Allgood v. RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Like the dangers of alcohol
consumption, the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community.");
Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 204 (D. Mass. 2000)
("[This Court is firmly convinced that the risks of smoking were quite clear to the population at
large before 1969 .... "); Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. C-97-070, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7346, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1997) ("[This Court concludes that
cigarettes are inherently unsafe and are known to be unsafe by ordinary consumers with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community.").
195 See Hill v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d 837 (W.D. Ky. 1999), which
observed:
Before the Court could apply the common knowledge doctrine as a defense to failure
to warn and dismiss Hill's claim, it would need to take judicial notice of the public's past
understanding of the risks of smoking.... [The judicial notice inquiry would focus on the
state of popular consciousness concerning cigarettes before 1969. The Court is simply
unwilling to take judicial notice of something as intangible as public knowledge over three
decades in the past. The exercise seems inherently speculative and an inappropriate topic
for judicial notice.
Id at 844 (citation omitted); see also Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515,
1526 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to take judicial notice of the common knowledge of smoking
risks).
1204 [Vol. 63:1165
FIT FOR ITS ORDINARY PURPOSE?
The distinction between the common knowledge of the general health effects
of smoking, as opposed to the public's knowledge of nicotine, also plays a major
role in the contemporary tobacco cases. 196 Many courts recognize a distinct
difference between common knowledge as it relates to the general risks of
smoking and common knowledge as it relates to nicotine addiction. Of the courts
that have made the distinction, most find that the dangers of nicotine addiction are
not common knowledge and therefore refuse to take judicial notice of this
disputed fact.197 The ultimate effect of this approach is that plaintiffs are able to
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has beaten its own path in analyzing the common
knowledge doctrine. In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988),
the court found that it was common public knowledge from 1974-1984 that smoking resulted
in ill health and affrmned the defendant's victory in the district court. Id. at 236. The court
limited its analysis to this time period because the Tennessee rule of repose prevented the
plaintiff from bringing a claim more than ten years after the initial sale of cigarettes. See also
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Twelve years later, the Sixth Circuit again examined the common knowledge doctrine as it
related to a smoker who claimed to have started smoking in 1950. Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219
F.3d 566, 567-72 (6th Cir. 2000). Applying Ohio law, the court was able to examine the issue
of common knowledge as it related to the time period prior to that examined in Roysdon. Here,
the court made a crucial distinction between common knowledge of general health risks, and
common knowledge of the specific disease of lung cancer. Id at 572. While the court did not
overrule its decision in Roysdon, it did distinguish the cases and added a new level of analysis
concerning the common knowledge doctrine. Apparently, it was no longer enough to question
the general knowledge of smoking and health, but rather the specific level of the public's
knowledge as it related to the plaintiff's disease.
Shortly after Tompkin, the Sixth Circuit further examined both cases and came to the
conclusion that courts should evaluate the extent of common knowledge of smoking and health
as it relates to the allegations stated in the plaintiffs complaint. Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2000). In Glassner, the complaint failed to allege that
cigarettes caused a specific injury, and only claimed that smoking was generally hazardous to
one's health. Therefore, the court only examined the common knowledge as it related to
smoking and the resulting general health risks and found that the plaintiff was barred from
bringing her claim. Id
196 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
197 See Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990),
which noted:
Defendants argue the "health risks" of smoking are well within the contemplation of
the ordinary consumer possessing ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
the characteristics of cigarettes and that the "habituating propensities of smoking have long
been common knowledge." However, Yvonne [Rogers] draws a distinction between the
addictive, as opposed to habituating, qualifies of cigarettes. There is no basis for our
judicially noticing what the ordinary consumer's knowledge concerning the addictive
qualities of cigarettes may have been when Richard began smoking in 1940. The state of
knowledge attributable to the community of individuals consuming cigarettes has changed
over time and will continue to do so. It was not until 1988 that the Surgeon General
published a report informing of the addictive nature of cigarettes.
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survive a judgment on the pleadings to the extent that defendants assert the
common knowledge doctrine as a defense. 198
Whatever formulation a court gives to the common knowledge doctrine, the
fact remains that there is no consensus among the courts as to whether there is any
assumed public knowledge relating to the danger of smoking. Some take judicial
notice that the risks of smoking are common knowledge; others refuse and hold
that it is an issue of fact for a jury to decide. The logical conclusion remains,
however, that a jurisdiction that commonly imputes knowledge of smoking's
dangers to injured plaintiffs will likely find that they have assumed the risk of
using tobacco. Therefore, their contributory behavior, as opposed to a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, will likely be the proximate cause of
their injury.
Another approach to dealing with assumption of risk lies in state statutory
law dealing with comparative negligence. Regarding OPLA and its
Id at 1054 (citation omitted); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797, 816-17 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (reviewing other case law concerning common knowledge and judicial notice). The
Wright court concluded that:
the court will refrain from taking judicial notice that the risks of cigarette smoking have
been common knowledge to consumers since Mr. Wright began smoking in 1954....
[Tihis court will likewise refrain from taking judicial notice that the risk of addiction has
been common knowledge to consumers since Mr. Wright began smoking in 1954.
Id In American Tobacco v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997), the court stated:
Thus, to the extent we hold that the general health risks of smoking were within the
knowledge common to the community[,] ... American has established that its cigarettes
were not unreasonably dangerous.... However, we also hold that American [Tobacco]
did not establish as a matter of law that the specific danger of addiction from smoking was
knowledge common to the community.
IL at 432.
198 Defendants have not abandoned the common knowledge doctrine merely because
plaintiffs have been successful in convincing some courts that the dangers of nicotine addiction
are not widely known. Rather, tobacco companies seek to condense the risks of nicotine
addiction into the broad knowledge of the ill-effects of smoking in general. This results in an
argument claiming that nicotine addiction is merely a "lesser included" risk associated with
smoking and should not be considered a significant new hazard requiring its own analysis under
the common knowledge doctrine. So far, this analysis has met with mixed results. See Wright,
114 F. Supp. 2d at 815 (citation omitted) ("[This court concludes that there is a considerable
difference between knowing that smoking is bad and knowing that smoking is addictive.
Therefore, this court rejects defendants' argument, and concludes that the risk of addiction is
not, as defendants assert, 'a lesser included risk,' of the risks of smoking."). But see Hollar v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("While more information may be
available about Defendants' allegedly 'intentional manipulation' of nicotine levels and their
campaign to resurrect a 'smoking controversy' that information does not negate the public's
long held knowledge that cigarettes are (and were) dangerous to health.").
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interpretations, 199 the General Assembly has a specific statute200 dealing with
comparative negligence in products liability actions.201 In Ohio, assumption of
risk, either express or implied, serves as a complete bar to recovery of damages in
a products liability action.202 Since implied warranty claims in Ohio are covered
by the OPLA, tobacco defendants have no reason to ignore this statutory risk
defense.203
199 See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
200 OtO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (Anderson 2001). This provision states in part:
(B)(1) Express or implied assumption of the risk may be asserted as an affirmative
defense to a product liability claim under [the OPLA] ....
(2) [l]f express or implied assumption of the risk is asserted as an affirmative defense
to a product liability claim under [the OPLA] and if it is determined that the claimant
expressly or impliedly assumed a risk and that such express or implied assumption of the
risk was a direct and proximate cause of harm for which the claimant seeks to recover
damages, the express or implied assumption of the risk is a complete bar to the recovery of
those damages.
Id. The Ohio General Assembly amended the original 1988 version of this statute in 1997 with
House Bill 350. In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,
1097-102 (Ohio 1999), the Ohio Supreme Court found that House Bill 350 violated the one-
subject rle of section 15(D) of Article I1 of the Ohio Constitution and thus declared the entire
House Bill unconstitutional. However, House Bill 350 did not amend the provisions relating to
the above quoted sections. Thus, the 1988 version of the comparative negligence provision,
section 2315.20 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for the same result as the 1997 version.
201 The reader should again recall that any claim for personal injury resulting from a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is a "product liability claim" and must be
brought under the OPLA. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
202 Oito REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(B)(2) (Anderson 2001). Much of the case law
relating to this provision is decided in the context of employees injured in the workplace by
defective equipment. This analysis is not directly analogous to the tobacco cases because
injured employees who are required to encounter defective products must balance their
economic need to earn wages with the risk associated with using a defective machine. In this
way, assuming the risk of injury may not be said to be voluntary. See Carrel v. Allied Products
Corp., 677 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio 1997) (acknowledging generally the defense of assumption
of risk in products liability cases, but holding that assumption of risk is only available if the
employee encountered the defective product as part of his or her required duties).
On the other hand, one would argue that smoking is completely voluntary and thus not
analogous to the employment context, but it is unclear how this argument would change if
plaintiffs assert the addictive nature of nicotine. In this way, plaintiffs could conceivably
convince courts that they had not assumed the risk of prolonged effects of smoking because the
physiological effect of addiction made the assumption of risk involuntary.
203 The practitioner should be careful to note that some states, like Texas, do not have
analogous assumption of risk statutes that relate specifically to products liability actions. See
supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. A close reading of the Texas statute, however, will
reveal a result similar to an assumption of risk defense-the plaintiff must allege and prove that
the dangers of the product were not commonly known to the public at large.
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2. Lack of Notice
Although buyers are required to notify sellers of a breach of warranty within
a reasonable amount of time, 204 the courts that have addressed this issue in detail
as it relates to tobacco litigation have ruled that the U.C.C. notice provision is a
nullity. In Wright, the court reasoned that the notice provision of U.C.C. section
2-607(3)(a) only requires buyers to give notice to "sellers" and tobacco
manufacturers are not sellers as defined by section 2-103(1)(d).20 5 Because the
tobacco manufacturers do not sell cigarettes to the plaintiffs, they are not entitled
to notice of the breach of warranty.206 The court concluded its ruling by stating
both that notice would serve no purpose in the case at bar and that the defendants
failed to identify how they would be prejudiced through a failure of being notified
about the breach of warranty. Therefore, no notice was required. 207
In Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc.,208 the tobacco defendants sought to
dismiss the plaintiff's breach of warranty claims for lack of notice of breach of
warranty. 209 Despite the fact that the plaintiffs apparently did not assert that they
had provided actual notice, the court found that tobacco manufacturers, like
asbestos manufacturers, were generally on constructive notice as to problems with
their products.210 The district judge reasoned that the numerous health inquiries
and lawsuits seeking to find liability in the tobacco industry were sufficient to
provide constructive notice and thus prevent U.C.C. section 2-607(a)(3) from
barring the plaintiffs claims.21' Furthermore, the court borrowed a theory from
tort law and declared that notice is not required when a manufacturer willingly
fails to disclose a defect in a product,212 despite that section 2-607 fails to provide
the plaintiff with such an excuse for not providing notice.213 The court then
204 See supra Part Il.B.
205 Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797,830 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
206 Id. (citing McKnelley v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981), for the
proposition that a manufacturer is not a seller and not entitled to notice under section
2-607(3)(a) of the U.C.C.).
207 Id. (noting further that "based on the defendants' thoroughly written and researched
briefs, coupled with their strong oral arguments, it is clear to this court that the defendants were
not prejudiced by the lack of notice of the alleged breach of warranty claims in this case").
208 964 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1997).
209 Id. at 464-65.
210 Id.
211 Id.
2 12 Id. (citing Wesley Theological Seminary of the United States Methodist Church v.
United States Gypsum Co., No. 85-1606, 1988 WL 288978, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1988)).
213 A complete analysis of Wright and Witherspoon would be lacking without a statement
about the inadequate reasoning applied by the courts in concluding that the notice requirement
simply should not apply to tobacco plaintiffs. In Wright, the court oddly invoked the ghost of
privity of contract in finding that notice must only be given by a seller, and the tobacco
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refused to dismiss the warranty claims for lack of notice. The result of cases like
Wright and Witherspoon indicates a tendency for courts to protect plaintiffs in
terms of fulfilling the condition of notice.214
defendants were not sellers since they did not directly sell the cigarettes to the smoker. If the
court adopts this restrictive meaning of the word "seller," then it must also use the same
meaning in analyzing the warranty claims alleged by the plaintiffs. The warranty provisions of
the U.C.C. are all couched in terms of warranties made by "sellers" to buyers. Therefore, the
tobacco manufacturers, who are not sellers according to the Wright court, could not have made
any implied warranties to the plaintiffs, and any discussion of notice is irrelevant. Furthermore,
the court concluded that the defendants would not be prejudiced by a lack of notice. This
ignores that a lack of timely notice would bar the plaintiffs from recovering under the U.C.C. It
is hard to imagine how the defendants could be prejudiced more considering that the court must
dismiss the plaintiffs claim if they cannot meet the notice requirement.
The reasoning of the Witherspoon court does not fare much better. For that court to make
its argument as to whether there should be some form of constructive notice, it first had to
conclude both that the defendants willfully failed to disclose a defect in cigarettes and that the
general public inquiries about health and cigarettes amounted to notice that cigarettes were in
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. These two issues, however, are hotly
contested in today's litigation, and it makes little sense to draw such conclusions at an early
stage. The reasoning appears to be an attempt to stretch greatly the meaning of notice in order to
protect tobacco plaintiffs. On the other hand, if courts choose to enforce the notice requirement
strictly, another seemingly unfair result occurs-plaintiffs with otherwise meritorious claims
are thrown out on what some may term a "legal technicality" that serves no purpose in the
tobacco context.
The answer to this conundrum, as usual, lies somewhere between the extremes. If courts
were to examine the requirement of notice and accept the conclusion that filing a complaint
fulfills the requirement in certain cases, such as tobacco litigation, plaintiffs would likely still be
protected while using a less creative interpretation of the notice requirement. Professor Harry
Prince best explains this conclusion first by examining what specific purposes notice serves in
warranty litigation. Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer, Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice
of Breach in Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REv. 107 (1987). Notice serves the following
purposes: to prevent stale claims, to allow the parties to negotiate a settlement before litigation,
and to allow a seller opportunity to correct the problems experienced by the buyer. lit at 115-
16. Professor Prince further concludes that a complaint should constitute notice if, among other
reasons, it actually fulfills the specific purposes of notice. Id at 131. In other words, filing a
lawsuit often provides great motivation for curing and settling warranty problems that may
otherwise be left unresolved. Professor Prince also examines the statutory language and official
comment to find that the complaint-as-notice concept fits well within the overall U.C.C.
scheme. Id at 128-32.
Taking this reasoning one step further, prior notice in a tobacco suit would serve none of
the purposes outlined by Professor Prince. Tobacco manufacturers certainly cannot cure the
problems created by cigarettes and, even today, it is inconceivable that they will settle an
individual claim short of summary judgment, if ever. In this way, Professor Prince's argument
is even more compelling. Allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to fulfill the notice requirement
with their complaint is a better solution than the reasoning used by the Wright and Witherspoon
courts and preserves any benefit for defendants when notice serves a viable purpose.
214 Plaintiffs, however, should be cautioned that not all courts will be so protective. In
Watkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Civil Action No. 90-130, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23328,
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V. A NEW COURSE FOR THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
What does U.C.C. section 2-314 and its current application to cigarettes
mean? 215 Are the courts on the right track, or is change in order? What are the
at *6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 14, 1998), the district court dismissed a plaintiffs claim for a breach of
implied warranty of merchantability because the plaintiff did not allege a defect of cigarettes
and further noted that notice must be given to the manufacturer within a reasonable time. It is
important to note, however, that it is much easier to fault the plaintiff with lack of notice when
other grounds for dismissal-like failing to properly allege a defect-exist.
215 Before moving on to a contemporary, simplified definition of "merchantability," we
must address a nagging issue that is apparent in numerous opinions dealing with the implied
warranty of merchantability-namely whether courts should interpret the implied warranty of
merchantability by importing concepts of tort law, contract law, or some other body of law. A
diligent researcher could begin the day reading cases specifically interpreting section 2-314 of
the U.C.C. strictly as a matter of contract law. Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
230 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So. 2d 569, 571
(Ala. 1986)) ("'[S]uch an argument [that cigarettes are unmerchantable] ignores the clear
distinction between causes of action arising under tort law and those arising under the [Uniform
Commercial Code] as adopted in Alabama."'). By midday, the practitioner would be well into
cases that struggle with the basic concept of the implied warranty of merchantability and have
difficulty concluding whether it is a common law tort action or one under the U.C.C. Tompkin
v. Am. Brands, 219 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Ohio law still recognizes a
common law tort of breach of implied warranty). At the end of the day, one will find cases that
only mention the implied warranty of merchantability as a synonym for Restatement section
402A. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964,969 (Mass. 1978). In Back, the court noted:
The Legislature has made the Massachusetts law of warranty congruent in nearly all
respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
For this reason, we find the strict liability cases of other jurisdictions to be a useful
supplement to our own warranty case law.
I (citation omitted). Thus anyone researching the implied warranty of merchantability-
U.C.C. section 2-314 or otherwise-must piece together concepts from all areas of law in order
to grasp the idea.
Whatever the reasons for amalgamating various tort and contract law theories into the
implied warranty of merchantability, the time has come to discontinue the practice. Complaints
should state clearly whether plaintiffs allege a breach of U.C.C. section 2-314 or a claim under
products liability law. Courts can then apply the appropriate analysis. The questions concerning
U.C.C. claims are relatively simple: was there proper notice?; are there any disclaimers?; how
have courts interpreted the privity requirements of the U.C.C.?; and so forth. If the claim is
based on products liability, then the courts evaluate the issues as they relate to the relevant state
law dealing with products liability, whether it be Restatement section 402A or other law. By
failing to make this distinction, courts essentially place defendants, plaintiffs, and the courts
themselves in legal limbo as to the subject of the particular lawsuit. If pleadings are designed to
provide parties with notice, then failing to provide a clear understanding of how courts will
handle breach of implied warranty claims guarantees the pleadings will fail in their purpose.
Defendants will be at a loss to identify their responsibilities in pleading affirmative defenses
such as lack of notice and the statute of limitations if they cannot determine how a court will
handle the warranty claim until after a judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, providing a clear
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future implications of the current jurisprudence? Are cigarettes really
merchantable? Many courts analyze the meaning of merchantability and whether
goods are "fit for the ordinary purpose," but few provide a helpful definition of
merchantability for future application. The following discussion concludes that
courts have developed an improper definition of merchantability in the tobacco
cases. A more basic, fundamental approach is preferred and further explored
below.
A. A New Approach: The Functional Purpose Test
Whether goods are merchantable under U.C.C. section 2-314 deserves a basic
analysis centered on the simple functional purpose fulfilled by the goods. The
term "functional" implies only a limited analysis of the basic ostensible purpose
of the goods. Does an automobile provide basic transportation? Does the
distinction between U.C.C. warranty actions and other products liability actions simply makes
the law easier to understand for litigants. For these reasons, it is time for courts and litigants to
be specific in their pursuit of claims under either the U.C.C. or Restatement section 402A.
As a final note, the difference between contract law and tort law deserves brief mention.
Whether warranty belongs in the realm of contract or the realm of tort is a question that is as old
as warranty theory itself. Some would likely say that warranty is neither contract nor tort. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLuM. L. REv. 699, 712 (1936)
("Warranty is a civil obligation [as opposed to a contract or tort]."); William Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE LJ. 1099, 1126 (1960) (noting that the concept of products
liability is "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract"). Grant Gilmore
actually considered the future of the Restatements and pondered what the third Restatement of
Contracts would embody. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 84 (Ronald KL.
Collins ed., 1995). Noting the "schizophrenic" nature of the first Restatement of Contracts,
Gilmore speculated that the walls between contract and tort law may further crumble by the
time the world sees the third Restatement. Id at 67-68, 83-4. Although we have not seen the
third Restatement of Contracts, it is eerie to think the RESTATIMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: STRIcr
PRODUCTS LIABILrY essentially fulfills Gilmore's prophecy. Now we have a Restatement that
describes a case that presumptively begins with a contract, and often ends under a nile of tort
law in a strict products liability action.
It is beyond the scope of this note to revisit this legal battlefield and attempt to
revolutionize our thinking about contract and tort law. It suffices to say that the implied
warranty of merchantability is codified in the U.C.C. and the language of the section is
relatively simple to understand, save for the true meaning of merchantability which we will
come to later. Some would say that this is merely another way of saying that warranty claims
belong in the realm of contract, but this is not necessarily so because the U.C.C. is not
necessarily a body of pure contact law. With its loose concepts of privity and unlimited
recovery for personal injury, the Code does not provide the kind of rigid scheme that some
commentators viewed as essential to the basic theory of contract law. See, e.g., GILMORE,
supra, at 23, 48, 67-68 (noting the formal, structured approach to contract law advocated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Samuel Williston). Therefore, courts should interpret and apply
section 2-314 of the U.C.C. as it relates to the body of law that we call the Uniform Commercial
Code, not Restatement section 402A. Viewed in this way, whether we call section 2-314
contract law or tort law has little meaning.
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lawnmower cut grass? Does the washing machine clean clothes? 216 As to
cigarettes, do they light and burn properly such that they functionally produce
common tobacco smoke? These are the very limited questions courts should
address in determining the merchantability of goods.
Simply analyzing the functional purpose of goods is not to say that goods
causing personal injury could never be unmerchantable. Rather, recovery for
personal injury still flows from a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability that proximately causes personal injuries. A defective fire that
fails obviously has not fulfilled its ostensible function of providing traction and
proper handling capabilities for an automobile. Therefore, any personal injury
resulting from the defective tire and ensuing accident is recoverable. A cigarette,
on the other hand, represents a different analysis. The cigarette's functional
purpose is to light, burn, and deliver tobacco smoke to the user. If the smoker is
injured by a malfunction in this process, such as an injury from a cigarette that
does not burn properly, then that injury is compensable. 217 However, an extensive
investigation hinging on the culpability of the tobacco manufacturers as to
whether they sought to injure or addict consumers is an analysis that does not fit
well under a current implied warranty of merchantability and is improper under
the functional purpose analysis.
The above analysis raises two immediate concerns. First, the functional
purpose approach results in a somewhat abrasive, oversimplified, and seemingly
trite conclusion concerning the merchantability of cigarettes, especially in light of
the serious health effects resulting from their use. The second concern is a simple
question: why do we need a more basic approach to interpreting section 2-314 of
the U.C.C., or alternatively, what is wrong with the way courts have interpreted
merchantability in the past tobacco cases?
The response to the first concern implies the answer to the second question.
That the functional purpose test is short in its analysis is precisely the reason that
it is needed. The alternative to the narrow functional analysis test is the broad
investigation into the history and subjective needs and purposes of the parties,
which produces a merchantability analysis that is inappropriate and goes well
beyond the basic promise that goods will work under section 2-314 of the U.C.C.
To state the proposition another way, we need a new approach to interpreting
section 2-314 because the analysis developed by courts in tobacco litigation is
unacceptable.
2 16 See 3 SAMUEL WILuSTON Er AL., WIuusToN ON SALEs § 18-1, at 77 (5th ed. 1994)
("There is no expectation nor any implication made by law that there be absolute perfection in
that product... however, it would be reasonable to expect that the washing machine will wash
clothes.").
217 See De Lape v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D. Cal. 1939)
(awarding damages to plaintiff for facial bums suffered when a cigarette produced a large flash
flame).
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The remainder of this note provides three reasons that the complicated
interpretation of merchantability espoused by many courts in the tobacco cases is
improper, and that a resort to a more basic interpretation is the viable alternative.
Specifically, the following pages show how an expansive analysis of
merchantability results in U.C.C. section 2-314 becoming a nullity in the shadow
of Restatement section 402A. Furthermore, interpreting U.C.C. section 2-314 as a
mere appendage to products liability law is likely contrary to the overall
conceptual purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code. Finally, a broad
interpretation of merchantability will result in a new era of mass tort litigation
concerning "toxic food" that will further weaken and distort section 2-314 as an
independent, viable legal theory.
B. The Need for a Narrow Interpretation of Merchantability
1. Avoiding a Nullity:
Giving Section 2-314 of the UC.C. a Life Of Its Own
The expansive inquiry into a multi-faceted definition of merchantability,
whereby courts evaluate the latent harmful effects of cigarettes and balance this
information with concerns of nicotine addiction, deceit by the tobacco industry,
and concerns about common knowledge, creates an analysis similar to that
required under Restatement section 402A.218 The result is that U.C.C. section
2-314 becomes synonymous or completely subsumed into the Restatement
section 402A such that it loses its basic character as a simple promise that the
seller's goods will work. The best way to understand the error in this approach is
by evaluating an example.
In Back v. Wickes Corp.219 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
concluded that the implied warranty of merchantability was the legal equivalent
of Restatement section 402A and thus established a new frontier in warranty
law.220 In a case involving the alleged defective design of a fuel tank on a motor-
2 1 8 RESTATEMENT (SEOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
219 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978).
22 0 Id. at 969. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the Massachusetts
legislature had (1) eliminated the privity requirement in warranty actions, MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
106, § 2-318 (2000), (2) extended the applicability of warranty law to leases, and (3) prohibited
the disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability in the context of consumer sales,
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316 (2000). After noting these facts, the court declared that the
state legislature had
jettisoned many of the doctrinal encumbrances of the law of sales, and what remains is a
very different theory of recovery from that traditionally associated with the sale of goods.
The Legislature has made the Massachusetts law of warranty congruent in nearly all
respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
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home that ignited after an accident, the court concluded that the Massachusetts
legislature had intended section 2-314 of the U.C.C. to serve as the state's version
of Restatement section 402A.221 Because the Massachusetts legislature had
eliminated the privity requirements and the defendant's ability to disclaim implied
warranties, the court reasoned that lawmakers had intended to remove all vestiges
of contract law associated with U.C.C. section 2-314, thereby creating a clone of
Restatement section 402A.222 Thus, the implied warranty of merchantability
became Restatement section 402A and vice versa, and the court eventually
required plaintiffs to establish either a design defect or a breach of duty to warn
users about the risks of a particular product. 223 Further cases went as far as to
require plaintiffs to offer a safer design for the product in order to recover under
U.C.C. section 2-314.224 All of this eventually made its way into the tobacco
cases as the courts applied this unique formulation of section 2-314 to
A useful comparison to Back comes from Ohio. In Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364
N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977), the Supreme Court of Ohio also analyzed the implied warranty of
merchantability in tort and concluded that:
there are virtually no distinctions between Ohio's "implied warranty in tort" theory and the
Restatement['s section 402A] version of strict liability in tort, and because the Restatement
formulation, together with its numerous illustrative comments, greatly facilitates analysis
in this area, we hereby approve Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d.
Id. at 271 (citation omitted). This conclusion seems entirely proper because it deals with a
common law warranty theory in tort and not with U.C.C. section 2-314. In this way, courts can
and should combine all common law warranty theories with Restatement section 402A.
However, any attempt to combine U.C.C. section 2-314 and Restatement section 402A would
remove the implied warranty from its context as part of the Uniform Commercial Code and
create even greater confusion in the application of U.C.C. section 2-314.
221 Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969.
222 Id.
223 Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984) ("[Ihe finding that the
warranty had not been breached signified that the product had not only been properly designed
but also that adequate warning of dangers had been given."); see also Kotler v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990). The Kotler court held:
Thus, a breach of warranty can occur if either (1) the product is defectively designed, or (2)
foreseeable users are not adequately warned of the dangers associated with its use....
[Furthermore,] [w]e are aware of no Massachusetts case in which liability attached in the
absence of evidence that some different, arguably safer, alternative design was possible.
Id
224 In Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D.
Mass. 2000), the court interpreted Kotler to require a tobacco plaintiff both to show that
cigarettes were defectively designed and then to offer a safer alternative design in order to
recover. Plaintiffs met this burden by showing, inter alia, that the defendant could have
removed more carcinogens with better dilution and filtration. Id. at 202.
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cigarettes, 225 such that tobacco litigants are now often faced with the confusion
and tension surrounding the implied warranty of merchantability and Restatement
section 402A.
In the tobacco context, the result of this confusion is not a basic review and
academic application of the U.C.C.'s implied warranty provision, but rather a
protracted analysis of design defects, failures to warn, possibilities of safer
designs, and other matters that typically lie in the field of strict products liability
law. The confusing panoply of state warranty law casts courts adrift in exploring
areas that seem to have little connection to a basic functional concept of
merchantability. Considering both the numerous cases discussing section 2-314 of
the U.C.C. and the full array of evaluations and analyses of tort law versus
contract law, some courts have essentially abandoned the basic promise from the
buyer to the seller that the goods will work.22 6 When courts evaluate section
2-314 in the same manner as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the
basic promise of functional merchantability ceases to exist and section 2-314
becomes a nullity in the shadow of Restatement section 402A.
2. The Conceptual Framework of the Uniform Commercial Code
Because commercial law was always viewed as being hopelessly behind
current business practices, 227 the creators of the Uniform Commercial Code
drafted the Code with the understanding that it should reflect commercial reality,
as opposed to serving as a fabricated regulatory scheme for commercial law.228
225 See Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1225 (following Back's formulation of section 2-314 of the
U.C.C.); Johnson,122 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (following Kotler); see also supra Part IV.B (dealing
with varying concepts of merchantability). Other states have their own quirks with regard to the
implied warranty of merchantability. For example, Illinois does not allow for recovery of
noneconomic damages other than personal injury under U.C.C. section 2-314. Rather, plaintiffs
are limited to tort law when trying to recover for noneconomic loss. See Seegers Grain Co., Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 577 N.E.2d 1364, 1371-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). The Illinois courts
follow this reasoning even in light of the fact that the Code tells us how to determine what
damages are recoverable. Section 2-715(2)(b) allows recovery for personal injury resulting
from goods, and section 2-715(2)(a) of the U.C.C. allows recovery for other damages that are
foreseeable to the parties at the time of contracting. The question then becomes: why
complicate the matter by delving into issues of economic and noneconomic damages when the
issue is resolved by determining what damages the parties could foresee at the time of
contracting?
226 See supra Part I. After reading the numerous cases on the implied warranty of
merchantability, one can also conclude the term Uniform Commercial Code is a misnomer in
warranty law.
227 Grant Gilmore, On The Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ. 1341,
1341 (1948) ("'There is apparently wide agreement that the law of sales, in particular, is
hopelessly behind the times.").
228 See id. ("'the principal objects of draftsmen of general commercial legislation-by
which I mean legislation which is designed to clarify the law about business transactions rather
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Therefore, the desire was to reflect current trends.229 If this is the reality the Code
serves, it follows that U.C.C. section 2-314 should not be subsumed into the
Restatement section 402A to the extent that the implied warranty of
merchantability becomes irrelevant. While the meaning of merchantability was
arguably broad enough to include products liability concepts, it does not follow
that the drafters foresaw the current evolution of Restatement section 402A that
included a subsequent dismissal of U.C.C. section 2-314 as a separate legal
theory. At the time of its drafting, consumer protections laws, including
Restatement section 402A, were practically non-existent and, in any event, not
nearly as developed as they are today. This is likely the reason that the definition
of "merchantability" is so nebulous in the Code-it gave courts the opportunity to
conduct broad factual inquiries and expansive analyses into whether goods were
merchantable in order to protect consumers.230 Even so, other law, like
Restatement section 402A and state consumer protection acts, evolved to protect
those interests. In this light, section 2-314 should not be viewed from the time of
its drafting in a post-World War iH era with little consumer protection law, but
rather in a contemporary era with well-developed statutes and case law that
protect consumers in other ways. Therefore, U.C.C. section 2-314 can best reflect
the current needs of commercial law if it is given a more fundamental
interpretation.231
than to change the habits of the business community-are to be accurate and not to be
original."); id. at 1350 ("The draftsman of a commercial act is supposed to be the recorder of
established usage ... ").
229 Id at 1359 ("Ihe theory of the proposed Commercial Code is that we must keep our
statutes up to date.").
230 See generally supra note 23.
231 Grant Gilmore, a prominent drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, was a
proponent of ensuring that statutes represented contemporary commercial needs. Although he
realized that statutes could not be re-written at will to deal with every new situation, he did
realize that judicial interpretation played an important role in maintaining the usefulness of the
Code. "As statutes pass quietly out of date without disappearing from the books, the effect is to
reintroduce a common law case system, which is perhaps peculiarly fitted to deal with the
fluctuations and mutations of commercial life." Gilmore, supra note 227, at 1359. Thus, any
court that seeks to maintain the relevance of U.C.C. section 2-314 and adopts a restricted
meaning of "merchantability" could do so while maintaining the purpose and spirit of the
Uniform Commercial Code. See also Daniel Gerson, Disclaimer of Warranties and Product
Liability, in TECHNIQUES, PROcEDuREs, AND PITFALLs UNDER THE UNIlORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE INSTITfrE 27, 34
(1968) ("Essentially, the Code has relatively little to do with the subject of Product Liability....
The application of commercial doctrines to Products Liability situations is an awkward one.")
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C. Fast Food and the Road Ahead
We take Joe Camel off the billboard because it is marketing bad products to our
children, but Ronald McDonald is considered cute. How different are they in
their impact, in what they're trying to get our kids to do?
Dr. Kelly Brownell, Yale Psychologist 232
Mass tort litigation often results from frustration arising out of a failure to
obtain legislative action controlling such unpopular institutions as the tobacco
industry.233 These cases often involve the implied warranty of merchantability 234
and seek to hold manufacturers liable for creating such social ills as gun
violence235 and the potential dangers of alcohol.236 The Courts that maintain a
232 Bridget Murray, Fast-Food Culture Serves Up Super-Size Americans, 32 MONITOR ON
PSYCHoLOGY 33, http://www.apa.org/monitor/dec0l/fastfood.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2002)
(quoting Dr. Brownell); see also Sealey, supra note 6.
233 See generally Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking
Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L REv. 549,550
(2000) ("The Attorneys General who sued the tobacco industry acted out of frustration with the
lack of political initiative to address the public health crisis .... "); see also U.S. Newswire,
New Mexico Supreme Court Ruling a Victory for Gun Safety Litigation, Clears Way for Trial,
(Oct. 22, 2001), http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/CunentReleases/l022-125.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002) (describing a recent case where plaintiffs sought to hold the gun industry
liable for its "irresponsible business practices that contributeld] to the shameful level of gun
violence in this country").
234 See City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson, No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS
352, at *69-73, 79 (Mass. Super. July 13, 2000) (refusing to dismiss, inter alia, gun
manufacturer's motion to dismiss breach of implied warranty count for failure to state a claim);
Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that properly
functioning firearms do not breach U.C.C. section 2-314).235 See Debra Burke et al., Women, Guns and the Uniform Commercial Code, 33
WLLAMErrE L. REv. 219 (1997). One argument as to why guns are not merchantable relies on
the common perception that guns are intended for self-defense. Burke concludes:
That guns can kill is obvious. However, it may not be obvious that guns are
ineffective for self-defense unless the user is adequately trained in the proper way to use,
store, handle, and care for the weapon. If a danger is not obvious, then the seller must warn
the consumer or the implied warranty of merchantability will be breached.
Id. at 226; see also id at 226 n.13 (noting several studies that show women who kill with guns
rarely kill in self-defense).
Much of this line of reasoning relates the assumption of risk defense available to
manufacturers facing breach of implied warranty claims. See supra Part IV.C.1. As Burke
notes, "[tihat guns kill is obvious." Burke et al., supra, at 227. This concession alone, regardless
of whether consumers were warned about proper training or safety, should be sufficient to find
that a plaintiff assumed the risk of firearm use and thus that no warranty was breached.
2 36 Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (seeking
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complex definition of merchantability will likely preside over a variety of these
suits in the future and will be forced to change either their interpretations of
U.C.C. section 2-314 or find that a variety of these unpopular products are
unmerchantable.
The most intriguing candidate for future litigation evolves from the attack on
the fast food industry, consisting of all merchants who manufacture and produce
foods high in fat, sugar, and calories.237 Admittedly, it seems a little far-fetched to
believe that courts will put Ronald McDonald and the Hamburgler in the same
category as Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man, but one's attitude changes
dramatically upon even a cursory examination of the current attacks on the fast
food industry.238
The similarities between cigarettes and fast food will undoubtedly be played
out in a recent class action lawsuit filed in New York by Caesar Barber in July of
2002, claiming damages for illnesses related to the over-consumption of fast
food.239 Barber's complaint, much like the tobacco suits, focuses on the
recovery for alcohol addiction based on the implied warranty of merchantability).
237 See Murray, supra note 232, at 33 (reporting Dr. Kelly Brownell's description of fast
food industry as the "toxic food environment'--the strips of fast-food restaurants along
America's roadways, the barrage of burger advertising on television and the rows of candies at
the checkout counter of any given convenience store").
238 See Geraldine Sealey, Whose Fault is Fat?: Experts Weigh Holding Food Companies
Responsible for Obesity, ABCNEws.cOM (Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/
sections/us/DailyNews/obesityblameO2Ol22.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2002):
Although no one is taking such legal action against the food industry, nutrition and
legal experts say it is reasonable to think that someday, it may come to that.
"There is a movement afoot to do something about the obesity problem, not just as a
visual blight but to see it in terms of costs," says John Banzhaf, a George Washington
University Law School professor.
[Although it will be difficult to challenge the fast food industry], some public health
advocates still say corporations should--and will-ultimately bear some responsibility for
the obesity epidemic.
"It will not be easy, but the public now sees the tobacco industry as having caused the
epidemic of lung disease and cancer," said Tony Robbins, chair of family medicine and
community health at Tufts University. "People need to be creative about this, but tobacco
was no minor opponent, either."
Itd; see also Megan McArdle, Can We Sue Our Own Fat Asses Off?, SALON.COM (May 24,
2002), at http:llsalon.com/tech/feature/2002/05t24/fastfoodlaw/print.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2002).
239 Complaint, Barber v. McDonald's Corp., No. 23145/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx
County filed July 24, 2002), http:/hnews.fmdlaw.comhdocs/docs/mcdonalds/
barbermcds72302cmp.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Barber Complaint]; see also
Obese Man Sues Fast Food Chains, MSNBC.coM (July 26, 2002), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/786102.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) ("Barber told MSNBC
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following: the health effects of eating fast food, the enormous sums of public
money spent to combat fast food-related illness, and the marketing efforts aimed
at children. Barber's complaint also alleges reliance upon "the skill and
judgments of Defendants... and [their] representations and warranties .... 1240
Distinguishing cigarettes from fast food seems simple at first because of two
important concerns. First, fast food is not addictive like nicotine. Second, the fast
food industry is not widely perceived as having preyed on unknowing consumers,
thus lacking the diabolical reputation associated with cigarette manufacturers.
Opponents of the fast food industry are slowly but steadily working to eliminate
these concerns, and if they succeed, courts will have an extremely difficult time
distinguishing their tobacco jurisprudence from the facts surrounding fast food
liability. As to addiction, activists are beginning to argue that high-fat foods
possess addictive characteristics that often result in eating disorders and the
current obesity epidemic. 241 Furthermore, others are beginning to vilify the fast
food industry by employing a public information campaign that is identical to that
used against cigarette manufacturers. Many believe that the tobacco industry
intentionally sought to addict young consumers so as to ensure lifetime
customers. Some are now saying the fast food industry is doing the same. The
following paragraphs explore these assertions further.
1. Fast Food and Addiction
The common perception that food is not addictive is the first argument as to
why fast food is easily distinguished from cigarettes, but recent research is
TV that he didn't realize fried food was bad for him until his doctor told him so three years
ago.").
240 Barber Complaint, supra note 239.
241 This note focuses on warranty law and not the politics of public nutrition and health.
Indeed the problems caused by America's poor diet are probably getting worse and possess a
global reach. See Frontline: Fat (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 14, 2002), transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fatletc/script.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2002) (identifying the numerous societal problems caused by poor diets, including
psychological impact such as eating disorders as well as the obvious physical health
implications); see also ERIc SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 241 (2001) ("Obesity is now
second only to smoking as a cause of mortality in the United States.").
If any political message is adopted in this note, it only seeks to address the issue of how far
the judicial system should stretch the meaning of warranty provisions contained in a
commercial code that was conceived long before the public outrage over cigarettes, guns, and
fast food. Along that line of reason, it is also appropriate to question the extent to which society
should allow litigation to become a proxy for legislation. See Daniel Akst, Challenging That
Cheeseburger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at C4 ("The point is not the merits .... The point is,
who decides? Despite the role of money in politics, government can regulate harmful products
whenever there is the political will to do so."); see also Patterson & Philpott, supra note 233, at
550 (noting that plaintiffs, including public entities, often use litigation after failing in the
legislative/political process).
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changing those attitudes. 2 4 2 Thus, it is clearly conceivable that certain fast foods
can be widely held to be addictive in the future; after all, tobacco has existed for
centuries, but major concerns about addiction have only surfaced in the last
twenty years.243 It thus seems clear that the trend is growing strongly in favor of
characterizing fast food as addictive, enabling plaintiffs to analogize their U.C.C.
section 2-314 claims to those of plaintiffs injured by cigarettes.
One counterargument to this line of reasoning is that, even though fast food
may be addictive, it is not as severe as the addictive effect of nicotine. This may
or may not be true, but analyzing merchantability from this perspective not only
requires an inappropriate analysis of addiction by ignoring the basic functional
purpose of cigarettes, but goes even further to inquire into varying degrees and
types of addiction. Are we to say that nicotine addiction makes cigarettes
unmerchantable, but fast food addiction is acceptable? How much scientific
evidence is needed to distinguish the two? This is precisely the unnecessarily
broad and expansive inquiry that the functional purpose test seeks to avoid.
Without a narrow analysis, there is seemingly no end to the level of detail courts
may pursue in trying to determine whether goods are merchantable.
242 Although fast foods apparently lack an addictive element, eating habits learned during
youth and the resulting eating disorders from unhealthy diets can potentially be analogized to
the addictive nature of nicotine and thus the comparison between tobacco and fast foods would
be complete. See Frontline: Fat, supra note 241; see also SCHLOSSER, supra note 241, at 123-
29 (describing the irresistible lure of good-tasting food, enticing food texture, and the artificial
flavor industry). Schlosser argues:
A taste for fat developed in childhood is difficult to lose as an adult .... mhe major
chains have apparently decided that it's much easier and much more profitable to increase
the size and the fat content of their portions than to battle eating habits [with healthier
food] largely formed by years of their own mass marketing.
Id at 241. Another author has observed:
The craving for junk food has hooked 90% of Americans and played a significant
role in widespread weight gain and the growing epidemic of obesity.
Whether the definition of addiction applies is still being debated, but the serious
nature of an entire nation's feelings about food can no longer be described as likes or
preferences. The combination of sensual foods in the modem world and a simplified
definition of addictions as "pleasure-seeking behaviors" means that "delicious" and
"addictive" may have no distinction ....
[Flood abuse is linked to the same brain chemical imbalances noted with drug and
alcohol abuse ....
LAuRA PAWLAK, STOP GAINNG WEIGHT 69-70 (2001).
24 3 See THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKiNG: NIcOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 185.
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2. Fast Food and Public Image
In terms of creating a negative public image that portrays the fast food
industry as preying on unknowing Americans who believe they are receiving
"merchantable" food, the strategies and tactics are identical to those used to attack
cigarette manufactures. 244 Like the tobacco saga, it all began with a public health
scare about the risks involved with poor diets, particularly those high in fat. The
demands for improved food labeling followed in order to inform consumers
better, much like the 1965 and 1969 Acts.245 Furthermore, states currently tax the
sale of cigarettes, and seventeen states currently tax the sale of certain fast foods,
mostly those sold in vending machines.246 These comparisons begin to focus the
picture, but the latest trends are so strikingly similar to those used against the
tobacco industry that it seems likely that mass tort litigation will follow.
The most recent tactics focus on issues that eventually turned the tobacco
industry into a public enemy and perpetuated its downfall and eventual
settlement: many today are accusing the fast food industry of focusing their
marketing on children247 and they are adducing statistics showing the enormous
244 See Akst, supra note 241 (asking if it is far-fetched to sue the fast food industry and
finding that "[tihe same line of reasoning underlies the litigation that has succeeded so
spectacularly against the tobacco companies; similar suits are pending against manufacturers of
guns").
24 5 See Bruce Silverglade, The Fight for Food Labeling Reform-An Insider's
Perspective, CSPINET.ORG (Jan. 1997), http://www.cspinet.org/reports/flfight.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002) (providing a commentary by the Director of Legal Affairs for the Center
for Science in the Public Interest).
246 See Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Tax Soda and Snacks to Promote
Health: Measure Recommended in the American Journal of Public Health, CSPINET.ORG
(June 1, 2000), at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/taxLindex.htnl (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
The article states:
Health Advocates at the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) and Yale
University recommended in a paper in the June issue of the American Journal of Public
Health that soft drinks and snack foods be taxed to provide funding for nutrition and health
campaigns.
The new study found that 17 states ... already have special taxes on soft drinks or
snack foods.
Id. (referring to Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and
Snack Foods to Promote Health, 6 AM. J. OF PuB. HEALTH 854 (2000), at
http://www.cspinet.org/reportsfjacobson.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
247 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 232 (quoting Yale psychologist Dr. Kelly Brownell as
stating, "We take Joe Camel off the billboard because it is marketing bad products to our
children, but Ronald McDonald is considered cute. How different are they in their impact, in
what they're trying to get kids to do?"); see also SCHLOSsER, supra note 241, at 42 (describing
the growth of advertising to children); The Center for Science in the Public Interest, Save
Harry!, at http://www.saveharry.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) (announcing a campaign to
save the popular children's character Harry Potter from an association with Coca-Cola, a
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sums of public money spent each year on health care related to complications
from diets rich in fast foods.248 In terms of advertising to children, fast food
manufacturers are particularly aggressive and often target Saturday mornings
when many children watch television.249 Additionally, fast food opponents are
also noting the large sums of money that are spent each year on obesity-related
illnesses-one estimate places the total at $117 billion annually.250 Without these
last two characteristics, the fast food industry lacks the diabolical nature of the
tobacco industry, but consumer activists are seeking to change the image. If the
transformation is completed, then the pending litigation and conceivable success
is merely academic. 251
vendor of "liquid candy" and a participant in a $150 million deal with Warner Brothers to
market Coca-Cola aggressively in connection with the Harry Potter character).
24 8 See Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Briefing Room: Diet and Health,
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/DietAndHealh/ (last updated July 30, 2002) ("Just seven
diet-related health conditions cost the United States $80 billion annually in medical costs and
productivity losses. ); see also Jim Barlow, What Will Be the Next Category of Victim?,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 25, 1997, at 1 ("The Florida [Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act of
1978] ... says that if any individual is the 'victim' of a product manufacturer-not just
cigarettes--and is also a Medicaid recipient, then the manufacturer can be sued for damages.").
249 See Sealey, supra note 238, who states:
"Certainly, fast food has been marketed overtly to children and my guess is if you
looked closely around the internal documents of the fast food industry and processed food
industry it would shock me if they didn't have very sophisticated studies about their
consumers," said Richard Nagareda, Vanderbilt University Law School professor.
"Whether you can take that to the level of a successful lawsuit is not so clear."
250 See Sealey, supra note 6, ("'The U.S. surgeon general said in a report last December
that obesity kills an estimated 300,000 Americans each year and costs $117 billion in health-
related costs."); see also Task Force on Tobacco Litigation, supra note 2 (describing the issues
related to state Medicaid subrogation suits).
251 When speaking of success in mass tort litigation, which often includes U.C.C.
section 2-314 in some manner, it is important to quantify and qualify the meaning of success.
For defendants, the liability is obviously crippling and likely to result in higher consumer prices.
One commentator argues:
Beer and liquor will be next, or coffee and cola, or the fast food industry. Lawsuits will be
filed-supposedly on behalf of the taxpayers-but the taxpayers won't get all the
proceeds. What they will get is a hefty rise in the price of coffee, soda, hamburgers and
goodness knows what else.
Amy Ridenour, Minnesotans Say No to 'Big Law', KNIGHT RIDDER/IRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE,
June 10, 1998, LEUXIS, Allnews File. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, receive some compensation,
but no one comes out further ahead than plaintiffs' attorneys. Id. ("Nationally, under the
Senate's tobacco bill, Professor Lester Brickman of Yeshiva University's Cardozo School of
Law estimates that Big Law will take home about fifteen percent of approximately $206 billion.
That's $30.9 billion-a figure that exceeds the annual gross national product of a majority of
the world's nations."); see also Amy Moritz Ridenour, Greed Imperils Tobacco Settlement,
VENTURA COuNTY STAR, Sept. 14, 1997, at D05 (noting that plaintiffs lawyers will receive
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3. The Implied Warranty Link: Tobacco and Fast Food
Why is all this important to section 2-314 of the U.C.C.? The answer is
simple-litigation against fast food producers, gun manufacturers, alcoholic
beverage producers, and others is unavoidable if courts maintain their current
merchantability jurisprudence as developed in the tobacco cases. The in-depth
analysis of industry behavior, common knowledge of "hidden" dangers, failures
to warn and a variety of other products liability concepts will enable plaintiffs to
bring more causes of action against these industries. Courts will then be faced
with the proposition of following their current tobacco jurisprudence and finding
that most of these industries produce unmerchantable products, or they will be
forced with the awkward and disfavored option of restructuring their
jurisprudence-a result that they are arguably faced with now. Thus, courts
should use the above analysis as a persuasive justification for adopting a more
basic interpretation, like the functional purpose test, in order to prevent the
constant ebb and flow of litigation against unpopular industries based on the
alleged breach of U.C.C. section 2-314.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tobacco cases present courts with a golden opportunity to steer the future
of U.C.C. section 2-314 in the right direction. As state supreme courts face
certified questions dealing with the implied warranty of merchantability, 252 they
have before them the ability to chart a new course and return section 2-314 to a
more basic approach of providing a simple promise from the buyer to the seller
that goods subject to the contract of sale will work. The expansive analyses of
merchantability applied by courts today erode the basic concepts of
nearly $3 billion alone from the $11.3 billion settlement in Florida). While these are only
preliminary estimates that could certainly change, they are not far-fetched by any means. Of all
mass tort litigation, the asbestos cases are extremely well documented. In the lifetime of that
litigation, over 60% of all money that has changed hands has gone to attorney's fees and costs,
with less than 30% going to compensate victims. See John C. Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 CoLuM. L. REv. 1343, 1388 n.173 (1995) (stating
that there is no reason to believe the numbers for the tobacco, gun, and fast food litigation will
be different).
252 Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cit. 2000)
(inviting the Alabama Supreme Court to comment on the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of
merchantability and cigarettes); Proof Brief of Certain Defendants on Questions of Law
Certified by the Hon. Mark W. Bennett of the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Northern Dist. of Iowa at
48-50, Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., (No. 01-712) (Iowa filed June 29, 2001); Reply Brief of
Certain Defendants on Questions of Law Certified by the Hon. Mark W. Bennett of the U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the Northern Dist. of Iowa at 24-25 (No. 01-712) (Iowa filed Aug. 20, 2001)
(requesting the Iowa Supreme Court to answer certified questions by declaring cigarettes
merchantable as a matter of law). Wright is currently awaiting oral argument.
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merchantability and result in an overall weakening of the Code by analogizing its
provisions to other laws. Therefore, courts should interpret section 2-314 of the
U.C.C. as a warranty that merely requires goods to fulfill the basic functional
purpose for which such goods are used. This approach ultimately provides the
best interpretation of the implied warranty of merchantability and ensures the
preservation of U.C.C. section 2-314 as a viable warranty in the sale of goods.
